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'Veiame ya, pronunciando en la Camara de Diputados un discurso viril y 
elocuente: la frente alta, la mirada segura, la mimica correcta y las palabras 
fluyendo con una elocuencia digna de Baptista. El costado izquierdo, 
ocupado por la oposicion, me contemplaria con rabia, mientras la derecha 
aplaudaria los periodos rotundos y logicos de las catilinarias con que yo iba 
a aplastar a mis adversarios.' 
Armando Chirveches, La Candidatura de Rojas, 1909. 
'El MNR era un partido populista, muy parecido al peronismo. Pero al llegar 
al poder supo darse cuenta de que era que habia que hacer.' 
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, Buenos Aires, July 1989. 
Political Transition and Economic Stabilisation: 
Bolivia, 1982-1989 
Introduction 
For many Bolivians there was more than a touch of irony in the fact that at 
the inauguration of Carlos Saul Menem as President of Argentina in July 
1989 so much attention - for once respectful and inquiring - should be paid 
to one of their number, present as a guest of honour. The man in question, 
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, was treated as little less than a delphic oracle 
by Julio Alsogaray, Menem's economic adviser, Nicaraguan President 
Daniel Ortega and the local media, all anxious to learn how this ex-minister 
of planning and prospective president had contrived to cut Bolivia's inflation 
rate from 15,000% to 16% in the space of two years without provoking food 
riots or a widespread collapse of social order. Many in La Paz had good cause 
to wince at 'Goni's' casual injunction - rendered in a thick accent bred of a 
youth spent in North America - that the only stabilisation plan worth its salt 
was one accompanied by a state of siege, under which recalcitrant trade 
unionists could be packed off to Patagonia for a while. Although this obser-
vation derived directly from the Bolivian experience, it scarcely modulated 
with the discourse of democracy accompanying the first handover between 
elected presidents in Argentina in more than 60 years. Nonetheless, what-
ever their political colours, those Bolivians who had witnessed the role of the 
Argentine military advisers in the coup of July 1980 and knew of the failure 
of their rich neighbour to pay the millions of dollars it owed for imports of 
natural gas were inclined to indulge the sly rumours that Menem had asked 
Sanchez de Lozada to be his economy minister and another Bolivian guest, 
Hugo Banzer Suarez - ex-dictator and also a challenger for the presidency -
to be chief of police. 
The cultural aspects of such badinage should not be disregarded, but 
beneath it lies the important fact that the political economy of Bolivia was no 
longer being treated abroad as a hopeless 'basket case' administered through 
corporatist politics that shifted between military authoritarianism and a syn-
dicalist-led 'populism'.1 In fact, many of the features that underpinned this 
perception remained intact after both the return to constitutional govern-
ment in October 1982 and the election of the Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario (MNR) in July 1985. Equally, it should be said that recent 
foreign attention to the Bolivian economy has not been matched by an 
interest in the country's politics.2 Indeed, longstanding presumptions have 
been only partially dislocated since in both economic and political fields 
Bolivia has continued to manifest extreme experiences since 1982. 
Apart from the fact that the country remains the poorest in mainland 
America, it has suffered from both the greatest inflation and the most severe 
deflationary policies witnessed in the continent since the early 1970s. At the 
same time, the first two civilian governments since the collapse of dictator-
ship served in their own ways to uphold - and even encourage - the image of 
a bi-polar model of politics, albeit within the broad parameters of the rule of 
law. (The first time - it might be added - since the mid-1940s, when the last 
stage of the government of Gualberto Villarroel (1943-6) and the first of that 
led by Enrique Hertzog (1947-9) witnessed respectively 'populist' and 'au-
thoritarian' policies applied under fragile but discernible constitutional con-
ditions.) 
In many respects, 'redemocratisation' in Boliva has been associated less 
with the institutional tasks of establishing a constitutional polity than with 
the expression of starkly contrasting social and economic policies. On the 
one hand, the coalition government of the Union Democratica y Popular 
(UDP; 1982-5) led by Hernan Siles Zuazo may be viewed as typically 
'populist' in that its essential thrust was towards deficit financing, acquies-
cence in labour demands, radical rhetoric, and a notable respect for human 
rights. On the other, the MNR government led by Victor Paz Estenssoro 
(1985-9) responded to an extraordinary economic crisis exacerbated - but by 
no means generated - by the UDP with an exceptionally severe and 
orthodox adjustment programme, alliance with Banzer's right-wing Action 
Democratica Nacionalista (ADN), disregard for the fuero sindical, and a 
clear disposition to reduce the state, encourage private capital, and collabo-
rate with the international status quo on issues such as the debt (in a formally 
heterodox but practically conformist manner) and the cocaine trade, or nar-
cotrafico (on a formally conformist but practically heterodox basis). 
The sense of an essential modal continuity with the pre-dictatorial era was 
sustained by the enduring dominance of political life by an 'historical' party 
- the right-[Paz] and left-[Siles] wings of the MNR - although such a pattern 
is also visible elsewhere, with the partial and complicated exceptions of 
Brazil and Ecuador. However, in the Bolivian case this sense was peculiarly 
enhanced by the fact that the two post-dictatorial presidents were them-
selves the principal architects of the state born of the 1952 revolution (Paz 
being president in 1952-6 and 1960-64, Siles in 1956-60). Indeed, although 
the passage of time and changing circumstances determined that they could 
no longer conduct themselves as twenty or thirty years earlier - a fact most 
evident in the need to form coalitions and leave the more energetic aspects 
of caudillismo to subalterns of a younger generation - the cyclical features of 
political life were underscored in a profoundly paradoxical fashion in that 
Paz, who had nationalised the tin mines, introduced an agrarian reform, and 
applied highly inflationary policies in the first years of the revolution, now 
sought to dismember the state mining corporation (Comibol), announced a 
substantial adjustment to the agrarian reform, and conducted a rigorously 
deflationary economic policy. Siles, by contrast, had initially been associated 
with the MNR's conservative wing, and in 1956-7 entered into a decisive con-
flict with the trade unions grouped in the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) 
precisely by applying an orthodox stabilisation plan that cut real wages, 
increased unemployment and reduced state expenditure to the requirements 
of the IMF and Washington. The fact that he strenuously resisted taking such 
a course in the early 1980s was widely perceived as emanating not just from 
a commitment to 'populism' but also from a personal refusal to relive the 
extreme bitterness of the mid-1950s. These reversals of prior practice were 
not, in fact, as simple as depicted, but they did throw into such sharp relief 
the trajectory of individual personalities that even in the 1989 election domi-
nated by figures of the 1970s (Banzer and Jaime Paz Zamora of the 
Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria [MIR], and the 1980s (Sanchez 
de Lozada and Carlos Palenque of Conciencia de Patria [CONDEPA]), it 
was easy to underestimate the degree to which Bolivian politics had 
changed. 
The general lack of interest in discovering the degree of balance between, 
on the one hand, Bolivia as part of the regional experience of redemocratisa-
tion and a manifestation of that experience in extremis (the relationship 
unity/diversity), and, on the other, the persistence of the old/'traditional' 
and the emergence of the new/'modern' (the relationship continuity/rup-
ture) cannot be properly rectified here. However, it should be noted at the 
outset that while this paper does not pretend to deal in detail with economic 
management,3 the coca and cocaine economies,4 or the travails of the left5 
- all critical issues in the post-dictatorial era - none of these phenomena 
lacks features that run counter to received beliefs and that confuse easy 
paradigms. 
With respect to the economy, it is evident that, in addition to notable fai-
lures to spur growth under both administrations, after 1985 the state sector 
was simply diminished rather than overhauled, agriculture was largely 
ignored and excluded from fiscal reform for purely political reasons (the 
'traditional' movimientistas over-ruling the 'modern' technocrats), and with 
the exception of a few instances of cooperativisation (most notably munici-
pal telephone systems) and asset-stripping (the sale of Comibol's reserves of 
unprocessed ore), privatisation remained a pious hope. Similarly, following 
a constant pattern since 1952, efforts to encourage new private investment 
produced insignificant results beyond recycling an increased proportion of 
narcodollars through formal channels. The social cost of both hyperinflation 
under the UDP and stabilisation under the MNR was exceptionally high; the 
latter altered its form but certainly did not reduce its impact. 
In terms of coca and cocaine the record of the last decade is similarly 
mixed. Whilst there have been indisputably major shifts in the patterns of 
production, population and labour in certair regions (Cochabamba, Santa 
Cruz and the Beni), and the officially sanctioned circulation of narcodollars 
has contributed significantly to mitigating the effects of the depression, there 
was no escalation of mafia-led violence on the scale witnessed in Colombia 
or, under rather different political and productive conditions, Peru. Equally, 
narcotrafico is not only based on legal cultivation of coca (in all areas until 
late July 1989; legally, only in the Yungas of La Paz thereafter), but it has also 
failed to produce distinct cartels. Rather, insofar as the capital flight of the 
1970s and early 1980s has been reversed, its assets have been recirculated 
through established structures and activities. In the same vein, it has 
deepened rather than extended previous systems of kinship-patronage and 
corruption, building on existing modes of illegal practice in the armed 
forces, police and leading political parties in a relatively 'unpartisan' fashion. 
The legacy of the open association of the military regime of 1980-82 with the 
cocaine trade has been a pattern of discreet infiltration - not the much-
vaunted 'takeover' - and, with several honourable exceptions, a response to 
US pressure that follows the logic of'obedezco pero no cumplo9 rather than 
decisive action. Although between 1984 and 1987 the US changed the 
emphasis of its policy from halting trade in cocaine to reducing production 
of coca, the terms it demanded of La Paz on both counts could not possibly 
have been met without destroying both the constitutional order and the 
economy - a fact clearly understood, if never admitted, in the US embassy. 
Finally, debate over the defeat of the left has frequently suffered from the 
schadenfreude of disillusioned fellow-travellers and closet reactionaries. 
Both they and the honest celebrants of the collapse of radicalism may prop-
erly identify this in the left's own terms - the structures and discourses 
derived from 1917 and 1952 - yet these must also be assessed in the light of 
the weaknesses of the right and those features of the new conservative order 
that have preserved the need for (and incidence of) popular mobilisation at 
the same time as they have altered its forms. Although the defeat of tradi-
tional radicalism was given a definitive character first by the association of 
both the COB and the parties of the left with the chaos of the UDP period, 
and then by the effective dismemberment of the miners union (FSTMB) fol-
lowing the 1985 tin crash, the moral authority of the left has been far less 
damaged than has its social project. An apparently minor compensation that 
might be deemed intrinsic to such a decisive setback in terms of power-poli-
tics, this is, in fact, a matter of considerable consequence in a country where 
the state imbricates closely with civil society, where the left has a minimal 
tradition of violence, and where the left's failings were seen (with some jus-
tification) to result from it being 'out of date' in its methods rather than 
wrong in its ideas. 
Thus, after 1985 the right exercised the political power given it by the elec-
torate with both flair and decision, but it failed to establish hegemony; at 
best it won acquiescence, which is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
hegemony. At the same time, it signally failed to institutionalise either the 
fragile consitutional order or its own domination.'Concertaciort proceeded 
by pacts, yet these pacts depended upon a division of the administrative 
spoils of the state between parties that had very diverse histories but minimal 
ideological differences. 
The failures of the left between 1982 and 1985 provided the right - includ-
ing the MIR - with neither the necessity nor the incentive to engage in any 
compromise beyond cabinet alliances. This certainly enabled the deflatio-
nary programme to be imposed without great difficulty, yet by the time of the 
1989 election campaign the contradictions of such an unchallenged domin-
ion had been laid fully bare. Not only was the 1985 MNR-ADN 'Pacto por 
la Democracia' broken on the premise - in the words of MNR Foreign Minis-
ter Guillermo Bedregal - that 'pacts are made to be broken', but the right 
also found itself engaged in a three-way internecine conflict resulting in a so-
called 'triple empate' (very roughly a quarter of the votes for each of the 
ADN, MNR and MIR) that could only be managed by electoral malpractice 
and a 12-week circus of offers and counter-offers over the spoils of state in an 
effort to secure the presidency through a vote in congress. This process 
involved a suborning of the judiciary that paralleled the extraordinarily pro-
longed and inefficient 'trial' of the leading figures of the 1980-82 dictator-
ship, most particularly General Garcia Mesa, who happily absconded in the 
middle of deliberations. In short, the final months of the 1985-89 MNR 
administration witnessed an outbreak of politiqueria of such proportions 
that the right came close to losing its already tenuous claim to uphold con-
stitutionalism, whatever its successes on the economic front. The majority of 
the left stood paralysed before this scenario, but a three-week hunger strike 
by two young radical leaders - Roger Cortez (Partido Socialist-1; PS-1) and 
Victor Hugo Cardenas (Movimiento RevolucionarioTupaj Katari de Libera-
tion Nacional; MRTKL) - in protest at the fraudulent cancellation of 14 elec-
tion results (including their own, but also those of all other parties bar the 
MIR, which was the principal force 'managing' the 1986 election law it had 
sponsored in congress) not only drew widespread sympathy but also signal-
led the potential for a radical renaissance within the constitutionalist 
framework. 
This preliminary qualification to a broadly-held view of the primary qual-
ities of the transition to constitutional government highlights the importance 
of those aspects of politics that are not immediately competitive and relate 
to what we might call the moral economy of public conduct.6 On such a non-
partisan plane the Bolivian experience of transition proves more complex 
and fragile than many care to admit. Seven years after it had been installed, 
the critical issue with regard to the consolidation of parliamentary democ-
racy was whether this could be ensured through the dominance of forces that 
had little to do with its initial restoration and which were content to 
maximise the advantages of their economic policies without attending to the 
institutional and ideological fissures bequeathed by the collapse of the trad-
itions of 1952. The administrations of Siles and Victor Paz were largely able 
to camouflage this structural weakness (one of the few characteristics that 
they shared), but it remained far from certain that a third regime, bereft of 
a historical discourse and the privilege of catharsis provided by initial bouts 
of redistribution or deflation would prove capable of ensuring stability 
within or without the parameters of the 1967 constitution, which was, after 
all, the product of a military regime. 
It is, of course, entirely plausible to view the prospects for the 'Gobierno 
de Unidad y Convergencia' headed by Jaime Paz Zamora and dominated by 
the ADN in a much more favourable light. It may be argued that the decision 
of General Hugo Banzer to withdraw his challenge for the presidency twice 
in four years justified the ADN's claim to be a paragon of democratic virtue. 
Equally, the final realisation of the longstanding slogan 'Jaime Presidents 
can be seen as vindicated both in terms of the MIR's claim to represent a new 
generation of political actors and its capacity to abandon the impedimenta of 
its erstwhile radicalism. (The claim was not without some foundation, 
although it was often forgotten that Paz was over 50 when he donned the 
presidential sash; the capacity was irrefutable but cost the division of the 
party.) Collaboration between what were normally viewed as the traditional 
right-wing and social democratic forces in the national political spectrum 
could also be presented as a mature strategic decision to introduce a mod-
icum of flexibility into the austere economic policies incarnated in Decree 
21060 of August 1985 without permitting a wholesale rush into inflation. 
Finally, a broader apologia for the formation of such an administration may 
be based on the fact that although its component parties came second and, 
by some margin, third in the election of May 1989, their combined vote was 
within 5,000 of the maximum achieved by any two candidates and did not, 
therefore, represent a significant abuse of the 'popular will'. 
Against such a view, it is worth noting the extraordinary incoherence of the 
Paz Zamora regime, composed of parties whose origins - in 'neo-marxism' 
and military dictatorship respectively - were not just polarised but had led to 
proscription and blood-letting over two decades. The absence of any signific-
ant accord prior to that signed two days before the congressional election of 
the president suggested that while such differences might have been radi-
cally reduced over the years, they had finally been papered over for the pur-
poses of obtaining office rather than as result of a more profound ideological 
convergence. In this regard, the strident electoral campaign of the MNR, 
and particularly Sanchez de Lozada, provided a more persuasive case for an 
'exclusionary alliance', indicating the limited political space available to the 
dominant bloc and the acrobatics required to operate within it at the same 
time as maintaining the pretence of competition. (In practice, personalism 
accounted for almost all of the competitive spirit of the affair; the high pro-
file given by the MNR to 'Goni' permitting the MIR-Nueva Mayorfa fully to 
exploit its dependence on the figure of Jaime Paz and thereby hustle into the 
backroom any lingering vestiges of social democratic ideology). 
In short, the 1989 poll obliged the right to take its differences into govern-
ment. Yet for many - perhaps a majority - of those who voted for the MIR 
and the ADN the purpose of their ballot was precisely to exclude the other 
from office. Moreover, this sentiment was strongly echoed within the rank 
and file of both parties whilst recompense in the forms of jobs and favours -
pegas - was naturally reduced by the alliance despite the creation of two new 
ministries. At the same time, a bedraggled left could view with some relief 
the prospects provided by a fusion of 'opportunists' and 'authoritarians' that 
combined (misguided) popular fears of a return to the economic policies of 
the UDP (with which the MIR was still associated) and the political system 
of the Banzer dictatorship (with which the ADN, as a 'vertical', if not per-
sonalist, organisation was even more closely associated). 
Although superstition is by no means the first victim of modernity or a neg-
ligible factor in politics, it is perhaps a touch sour to note that when, during 
the congressional debate of 4 August 1989 to elect the new president, ex-
deputy Victor Hugo Cardenas sought to support his rejection of the rigged 
results of the May poll with a quote from the scriptures, it was discovered 
that the bible upon which the new members of the legislature had sworn 
their oath was, in fact, a missal in Latin, unintelligible to all. At the time, this 
incident provoked some levity, but as the notably inferior contributions from 
the floor dragged on until seven the next morning there was comment in the 
barra that the next four years would be based as much on ignorance as on 
blind faith. 
This paper is organised in two sections. For reasons of space it is not possible 
to provide a proper narrative for seven highly eventful years. As a result, 
these are presented in the form of a synoptic chronology (Appendix One), 
which, together with the statistical appendices, gives at least an idea of the 
principal developments of the period that are discussed in very general terms 
in the first section. Of course, this arrangement is less than ideal, even for a 
research paper. However, it may perhaps be excused on the grounds that it 
at least makes available the basic record and facilitates the opening of discus-
sion. 
Background 
Discussion of political transitions - broadly understood here to signify 
changes of governmental system - cannot be limited to factors of con-
juncture and agency, although these are the most apparent constituents of a 
phenomenon in which elements of rupture are more pronounced than those 
of continuity. This is especially true of Bolivia, where, as has already been 
inferred, modern politics can be described as a 'continuity of ruptures'. 
Some sense of this may be gleaned from Table One. 
Table 1: Bolivian Governments, 1952-1982 
1952-56 Victor Paz Estenssoro 
(MNR) 
1978 
1978-79 
1979 
April 1952 National Revolution; popular 
mobilisation; major mines nationalised; 
agrarian reform; rule by decree; rightist 
opponents repressed; inflation. 
'Semi-open' election; deflation; army 
rebuilt; right and left opposition 
harassed; centralist control of MNR; 
COB in retreat. 
'Semi-open' election; economic 
stability; COB subordinate; MNR 
divisions grow; army role increases; 
left harassed. 
'Semi-open' election; MNR splits; 
army becomes main political arbiter. 
Coup, followed by repression of COB 
and left; military-campesino pact; 
economic stability with opening to 
foreign capital; 1967 constitution; 
controlled congress; short-lived 
guerrilla; massacres in mines. 
Vice-presidential succession after 
death of Barrientos; effective military 
rule. 
Coup; 'nationalist' military rule with 
mixed cabinet; short-lived guerrilla; 
left recovers in conditions of 
semi-legality. 
Coup; 'left nationalist' military rule; 
COB-dominated asamblea popular; 
political polarisation. 
Coup; right-wing authoritarianism; 
military alliance with MNR (Paz) and 
FSB to 1974; 1974-8 'institutionalist' 
regime under personalist control; COB 
and left repressed; collapse of military-
campesino pact; economic growth; 
progressive indebtedness. 
Juan Pereda Asbun (military) Fraudulent election followed by coup; 
weakened dictatorship. 
Coup; 'benign dictatorship' by army 
constitutionalists. 
Elected by congress after failure of Siles 
(31.22%) and Paz (31.13%) to secure 
victory in poll; weakened executive. 
1956-60 Hernan Siles Zuazo (MNR) 
1960-64 Victor Paz Estenssoro 
(MNR) 
1964 Victor Paz Estenssoro 
(MNR) 
1964-69 Rene Barrientos Ortuno 
(military) 
1969 Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas 
(PDC) 
1969-70 Alfredo Ovando Candia 
(military) 
1970-71 Juan Jose Torres (military) 
1971-78 Hugo Banzer Suarez 
(military) 
David Padilla Arancibia 
(military) 
Walter Guevara Arce 
(PRA/MNR) 
1979 Alberto Natusch Busch Coup; 16-day dictatorship defeated by 
(military) worker, congressional and US 
opposition. 
1979-80 Lidia GueilerTejada Appointed by congress; weakened 
(PRIN/MNR) executive; attempts at deflation. 
1980-81 Luis Garcia Mesa (military) Coup, following UDP victory in 
elections; left repressed; ADN 
militants serve rightist dictatorship 
tarnished by support from narcotrafico. 
1981 Military Junta Coup, following US and military 
opposition to Garcia Mesa and Interior 
Minister Luis Arce Gomez; left remains 
repressed; military divided. 
1981 Celso Torrelio Villa (military) Internal coup; army hardliners retain 
power but adjust policies to US 
demands. 
1982 Guido Vildoso Calder6n Institutional agreement; hardliners lose 
(military) power to 'transitionalists'; curbs on 
COB lifted; economic crisis deepens. 
A number of very broad points signalled by the table and relevant to an 
understanding of developments after 1982 deserve further emphasis. 
i) Governmental stability was not primarily associated with con-
stitutionalism, still less with the holding of elections. 
Insofar as such an association can be stipulated, it applies only to the period 
1899-1930 under the ancien regime of the Liberal and Republican parties, dur-
ing the domination of the tin oligarchy, prior to the introduction of universal 
suffrage and with exceptionally insecure terms of competition. 
From 1956 the MNR presided over a full and formal constitutional apparatus. 
However, this was heavily manipulated, coexisted with important mechanisms 
of 'popular'/party control (militias; secret police; expanded syndicalist fueros), 
and reflected - even encouraged - political instability from 1960 onwards. 
The banzerato of 1971-78 was profoundly anti-democratic in character and, in 
line with similar regimes in the Southern Cone, postulated a direct relation-
ship between stability and the absence of political competition and civil liber-
ties. 
ii) Constitutionalism was broadly viewed as intrinsically weak, highly vul-
nerable to alternative means of expressing corporate interests, and more of 
a mechanism of truce/transition than continuity. It was not closely identified 
with the interests of any social class. 
After 1964 the fuero sindical had been suppressed under dictatorships but also 
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respected by some military regimes, notably Torres but also Padilla, and was 
not intimately associated with a full division of powers. The union movement 
had historically gained most under 'bonapartist' regimes (Busch, Villarroel, 
MNR, Torres). Similarly, the right had flourished under authoritarianism 
(1946-51; 1964-69; 1971-78) and found itself critically divided in 'open' elec-
tions (1951; 1960; 1964). 
As a result, civilian conservatives were accustomed to 'knock on the barracks 
door' and service military regimes whilst many on the left continued to place 
hopes in 'progressive' officers right up to the early 1980s. (Outside of the COB 
leadership - vulnerable but divided over this issue since 1964 — the Com-
munist Party (PCB) and MIR were the most prone to this option, particularly 
in 1979-81.) 
The first election since 1951 for which the result was not, for various 
reasons, a foregone conclusion, was that of 1979. In this respect, the most 
important feature of constitutionalism was greatly diminished in the popular 
eye. 
Such a trajectory meant that it was not just extremist political actors but broad 
sectors of civil society that harboured substantial doubts as to the value of con-
stitutionalism in modulating antagonistic social programmes for any signific-
ant period of time. It was identified with stalemate, not consensus; it lacked 
hegemony. 
iii) By the late 1970s the political legacy of 1952 had become dissipated to 
the degree that no single electoral front could secure a victory in terms of its 
identification with the Revolution. At the same time, both the right and the 
left lacked the ability to break from minority electoral status on their own. 
As a result, party alignments remained very fluid and dominated by prag-
matism. 
From 1978 to 1983 this process revolved around three insecure nuclei: 
a) on the right, Banzer's ADN, the most constant formation but still prone to 
militarist overtures and limited in its popular appeal by both its conservatism 
and the authoritarian past of its leader ; 
b) on the centre-right, Victor Paz's MNR, bolstered by its association 
with 1952 (particularly in the campo) yet limited by Paz's erstwhile collabor-
ation with Banzer, and a significant right-wing current still amenable to co-
operation with the military; alliance with Oscar Zamora's 'maoist' PCB-ML 
counteracted these tendencies to a strictly minimal degree and after 1979 was 
of greater regional than ideological importance (Zamora, like the Paz family, 
is from Tarija; in 1989 he backed the MIR-NM and became minister of 
labour); 
c) on the left, Siles's MNRI, which compensated for a lesser inheritance from 
the revolutionary era with its progressive stance from the early 1970s. How-
ever, the party was less disciplined and emphatically led than the MNR and 
depended heavily upon its alliance with both the 'modern' left (MIR) and that 
of more orthodox hue (PCB), which alienated other important radical cur-
rents (particularly the PS-1) and made the front the least stable of all, reliant 
on tactical as well as conviction voting by many members of the COB. 
It is not until 1982 that these currents are able to operate with significant 
independence from the officer corps. They failed to establish any viable coal-
ition government before October of that year; and at no stage between 1979 
and 1989 did an electoral front win a clear mandate at the polls. 
As a consequence, exceptionally fluid terms of competition aggravated 
ideological differences to spur organisational division, a multiplicity of tacti-
cal alliances, and a progressive erosion of political affinities constructed over 
three decades. 
iv) The military remained critically divided between 1978 and 1982. 
A number of factors are evident here: antipathy to Banzer's personalist rule; 
the endurance of a subordinate 'progressive bonapartism' (derived not only 
from the 1930s and 1940s but also from the influence of the MNR and the 
impact of the Velasco regime in Peru); the competitive influences of, particu-
larly, Argentina (anti-communism) and the US (anti-narcotrafico). 
v) Syndicalism continued to exercise considerable popular authority. 
Although the COB leadership consistently desisted from pursuing the central 
objective of its 1970 programme to establish a popular, socialist democracy, 
the rank and file were centrally responsible for mass opposition to militarism 
between 1977 and 1982. This not only enhanced the COB's legitimacy but also 
heightened that of direct action although it was now in significant contradic-
tion with the end - constitutional government - to which it was employed. 
The anti-dictatorial struggle was, therefore, not only conducted along tradi-
tional corporatist lines, it also enlivened expectations of economic and politi-
cal reorganisation that were singularly at odds with the objectives and 
capabilities of the major political parties. 
vi) The violation of human rights and culture of violence followed a pattern 
distinct from that elsewhere in the Southern Cone (except Paraguay). 
The left had a very marginal history and culture of violence; guerrilla-ism was 
insignificant as a factor either in generating dictatorial government in the first 
place or in overthrowing it. Whilst appreciable, the level of terror under 
Banzer was notably lower than that in Chile or Argentina. That under Garcia 
Mesa was temporarily of a comparable level but occurred after two years of 
struggle, without US support and amidst extreme military division over 
paramilitary activity organised by Argentine 'experts' and foreign fascists. 
Active resistance continued throughout and fear was not systematised. 
As a result, constitutionalism was not as closely associated as elsewhere with 
either a 'setting of scores' or 'peace at any price'. This was a two-edged sword. 
On the one hand, it facilitated military acquiescence in transition through the 
scapegoating of very few individuals (excluding Banzer - unsuccessfully 
charged in congress in 1979 - and Garcia Mesa's associates bar members of the 
cabinet). On the other, it reduced the cathartic and consensual qualities of 
civilian administration in the immediate post-dictatorial period. 
vii) The chronological pattern of 'redemocratisation' was at variance with 
that elsewhere. 
Pressure from Washington and mass mobilisation from late 1977 produced 
what was, in regional terms, an early experience of transition, without a 
graduated 4apertura? or support from neighbouring states (except Peruvian 
neutrality). Recidivist militarism thereby gained critical external support, 
notably from Argentina. The left, by contrast, was in a position to be spurred 
by the example of the Nicaraguan revolution (notably in November 1979). 
The eventual inauguration of Siles in October 1982 more closely fits the reg-
ional pattern, but it should be noted that he entered office having won elec-
tions held in 1980 on a platform ill-suited to the new political and economic 
conditions. Unlike the pattern elsewhere (but not in Ecuador), the left took 
office before the right, which actively sought such an outcome once militarism 
was clearly doomed. 
viii) The role of Washington was important but not decisive. 
Under Carter, pressure on the military was forthright and spurred reactionary 
nationalism. However, conservative expectations of fulsome support from 
Reagan were dashed by the cocaine issue, which obliged continued policies of 
containment despite the relative strength of the left. 
This combination had the effect of curbing left-wing nationalism and enabled 
the US to maintain a relatively low profile, relying less on 'intervention' than 
on 'benign non-collaboration'. Both before and after 1982 the effect was even-
tually decisive but slow to emerge. 
ix) The military regimes did not attempt to introduce a neo-liberal 
economic model. 
Despite fierce efforts to suppress wage costs, occasional endeavours 
at privatisation, (unrewarding) concessions to foreign capital and general 
adhesion (up to 1978) to IMF directives, the military maintained the MNR's 
statist approach. Its constituency was upheld through reapportioning the 
surpluses, contracts and loans accumulated through the post-52 public sector 
exchange rate policies favourable to agri-business and proscriptions of trade 
unions. 
This pattern was facilitated by the price and loan boom of the mid-70s, which 
terminated in the midst of the transition. Restoration of civilian government 
occurred within weeks of the 1982 debt crisis and after 24 months of extensive 
pillaging of public finances (through both old-fashioned larceny and the rais-
ing of dubious loans). 
Economic and political 'logics' were, therefore, as elsewhere, 'out of sequ-
ence'. Yet Bolivia was partly distinctive in that no major orthodox deflatio-
nary offensive had been attempted prior to redemocratisation; this option 
thus remained pending. (A broadly similar position obtained in Peru in 1980, 
but under much more favourable circumstances; even in 1989 the Paraguayan 
economy remained singular enough not to admit to ready comparison; one 
might argue about the degree of 'shock' inflicted by Martinez de Hoz in 
Argentina, but if it was more modulated than in Chile it was certainly more 
concerted than any policy hitherto essayed in Bolivia). 
x) The period of transition itself witnessed no significant 'new social move-
ments' to which its success might be attributed. 
It is the case that the campesino movement acquired unprecedented weight 
and independent organisational form in the CSUTCB in 1979, but this 
development upheld in more radical form many of the 'traditions' of altip-
lano, restoring some of the diminished influence of the rural majority. It did 
not represent a major shift in socio-economic structures, and neither did it 
produce a decisive realignment of political power or patronage; radical expec-
tations for this were soon dimmed by the MNR's resurgent electoral appeal 
and the latent anti-communism of katarismo. 
The issue of formal, national political power was decided between 1977 and 
1982 very much in terms of established forces and discourses. It was only after 
1983/4 that the parameters of collective identity and organisation - in both 
town and countryside - began to register significant change. However, it 
should be noted that a) the growth of the 1970s had expanded the urban mid-
dle class, providing Banzer with a constituency, primarily at the expense of 
the MNR, and b) the germs of economic change - narcotrafico and weakness 
in the mining sector - were already quite evident in the early 1980s, and both 
played a part in the transition, even if at that stage through familiar patterns 
of behaviour and organisation. 
The Government of the UDP, October 1982 to August 1985 
The popular euphoria that greeted the inauguration of Siles in mid-October 
1982 at the head of the UDP coalition (MNRI; MIR; PCB) was not entirely 
misplaced. The armed forces were badly divided, demoralised, tarnished by 
association with narcotrafico, and now controlled by a determined group of 
generals who had taken up arms against the dictatorship in 1981, enjoyed US 
support and clearly favoured civilian rule (even if they were notably sym-
pathetic to Paz's MNR). The anti-dictatorial mobilisations of September and 
October indicated a level of support for constitutionalism that cowed the 
civil police and effectively drove Garcia Mesa's paramilitary apparatus 
underground (which, in local terms, meant that they stashed their weapons, 
kept their heads down and started looking for new jobs; whilst they had, 
occasionally, acted like the Romanian Securitate, they were never treated 
like them, for good or ill). Although the UDP contained Communists, it was 
soberly welcomed by Reagan's White House, received much more resolute 
European support (particularly from France and Spain) and a clear signal 
from the conservative parties that they would respect the 1980 election 
results. On the international plane, the Malvinas defeat and economic reces-
sion had evidently reduced the spoiling capacity of the Argentine junta; 
Brazil continued to move cautiously towards civilian rule; Peru had already 
achieved it. Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela all offered forthright sup-
port; the military's previous aggression towards the Andean Pact had bred 
abnormally warm sympathy for the civilian opposition, of which Siles was 
the clear figurehead. 
Nevertheless, from its first day in office the new government faced consid-
erable problems. Official figures for the third quarter of 1982 indicated a 
major economic crisis (see Appendix Two) while estimates for capital flight 
in 1980 and 1981 stood at $370 m. and $347 m. respectively - more than a 
third of legal export earnings.7 The UDP largely owed its restoration to 
power to the COB, whose rank and file had borne the brunt of the repres-
sion, had been unable to defend their wages against an inflation rate of nigh-
on 15% per month, and were both well organised and in boisterous mood. 
Although the PCB was in office (ministries of labour and mines), its capacity 
to influence the independent majority of the COB leadership and a tradition-
ally suspicious membership was very limited. Equally, control of the execu-
tive was qualified by the fact that the UDP lacked control of congress, where 
the informal MNR-ADN bloc possessed an effective majority in the Senate 
and was very close to one in the House of Deputies. Fully aware of the pit-
falls this threatened, Siles had resisted acceptance of the 1980 poll result and 
insisted upon new elections that would reflect the state of public opinion 
after two years of military rule (including the collaboration of senior adenis-
tas). In this he was supported by the PCB, which called for fresh elections in 
December 1982. However, the MIR, whose Jaime Paz Zamora held the vice-
presidency, joined the right in demanding an immediate ratification of the 
1980 result under the slogan 'el hambre no espera'. This, together with man-
ifest differences of opinion within the MNRI, signalled important tensions 
within the alliance even before it had entered office. At the same time, 
institucionalista control of the military did not extend to a purge of the officer 
corps beyond those very few figures publicly associated with narcotrafico. If 
the armed forces were, as a whole, compliant, there were still at large, and 
in important commands, officers appalled at the sight of the PCB taking 
cabinet portfolios. Moreover, the cocaine trade had not diminished at all, 
and the administration faced major - if not insuperable - difficulties in sub-
duing it, with or without US support (which it clearly sought to avoid). 
Finally, although Siles's frail appearance and gentle comportment con-
trasted favourably with the brusque demeanour of the soldiers who had pre-
ceded him, providing an avuncular image suited to a new era of consensus, 
it soon became clear that he lacked resolution and control over his cabinet, 
party and coalition allies. Despite enjoying broad sympathy, he was scarcely 
even primus inter pares within the government - a position of critical weak-
ness with respect to managing the inevitable rush for the spoils of office 
(never enjoyed by the MIR and PCB, and not for over a decade by the 
MNRI) and still more so with regard to upholding executive authority 
against a congress that was able to mask its ideological enmity with demands 
for a full division of powers. 
Siles saw his political role as one of averting conflict at all costs and main-
taining public order without resort to violence. His past clashes with the 
COB, strong commitment to pacifism, and dedication to consensus politics 
betokened an outlook that was supremely suited to the tone of civilism and 
no less ill-suited to giving it substance. However, if the president's disposi-
tion aggravated the fissures and confusions within the UDP, these were 
equally the result of objective circumstances over which even the most deter-
mined government would have had little control. It should be noted here 
that comparisons between the UDP and MNR administrations are invidious 
insofar as Victor Paz took office after Siles had endured a swathe of political 
problems that were intrinsic to any first post-dictatorial administration - a 
fact that could not have been ignored by the right when it supported the 
UDP's entry into government. (In this respect, the MIR rapidly learned an 
invaluable lesson, for which it paid a high price as a party but a rather low 
one in terms of its most ambitious leaders). Siles's preferred option was not 
only at variance with popular sentiment, it also appeared to be sectarian and 
ran the risk of prolonging the stalemates of 1978-80. The right, by contrast, 
could maximise the advantages of opposition and what in technical parlance 
could be described as a 'depressed learning curve'. Although it had good 
reason to fear a flurry of radical policies, it could also perceive that the UDP 
was in a poor position to meet the very high expectations of the populace. 
In sum, the UDP was faced with an unprecedented economic crisis when 
it lacked internal cohesion, decisive leadership, full military support and 
control over both congress and the economy's leading commodity, cocaine. 
It was not, then, surprising that within a year its popular support was greatly 
diminished and that in less than three it was comprehensively defeated at the 
polls. However, the scale of that defeat was by no means a foregone conclu-
sion and reflects multiple errors, the opposition of the COB and the 
resurgence of the right. The trajectory of this decline into confusion, inac-
tion and then effective abdication is outlined in the chronology, but its most 
pronounced features deserve some further cursory observations. 
The Economy 
The UDP's economic policies have been characterised - most frequently 
after Paz's 1985 deflation - as both technically inept and irresponsibly redis-
tributionist. In fact, they were profoundly inconsistent, sometimes attempt-
ing stabilisation at the expense of capital and in defence of wages (Nov. 1982; 
May 1985), sometimes seeking an orthodox deflation that clearly prejudiced 
labour, even if it did not appreciably assist productive capital (April 1984; 
Nov. 1984; Feb. 1985). Table Two gives a summary depiction of the principal 
measures, which may best be understood in conjunction with the appen-
dices. Whilst the abject failure of all these initiatives is indisputable and 
borne out by the statistics several less obvious points deserve brief comment. 
The first is the least publicised by critics on the right: many entrepreneurs/ 
speculators made fabulous fortunes out of hyperinflation by either acquiring 
cheap dollars from the Banco Central and selling them on the parallel mar-
ket (which existed throughout, regardless of periodic proscription) or simply 
'informally repatriating' dollar savings to the same end. Equally, the consis-
tently - and massively - over-valued exchange rate encouraged enormous 
profits through contraband, which was a far more 'socialised' activity but still 
the means for remarkable concentrations of wealth. (In contrast to the crisis 
of 1954-7, goods remained available throughout, but only a miniscule per-
centage could be bought at subsidised rates, and there was no real effort, 
unlike in the 1950s, to exercise physical control over the black market except 
occasionally that in dollars). TTie restrictions on the formal banking sector 
were also off-set by the fact that it took loans at zero interest and extended 
them at nominal rates, thereby sharing in the government's short-term 'seign-
ourage gains' made by printing money. 
Table Two: Major UDP Economic 'Packages' 
Devaluation: Bs.44.5 - 200 per US$ (parallel rate: 250); min. 
wage: Bs.5,990- 8,490 (US$42); indexation of wages; private 
banks excluded from exchange market ('de-dollarisation') 
Devaluation: BS.200 - 500per US$ (parallel rate: 1,200); 
reduced subsidies on foodstuffs; disputed indexation 
maintained; min. wage = Bs.30,100 (US$33) 
Devaluation: Bs.500-2,000 per US$ (parallel rate: 3,000); 
formal indexation halted (av. productive sector wage rise is 
13%; 40,000 public sector employees get food bonus at 
50% of wage). 
Basic prices officially controlled; av. 30% wage rise; official 
limit on debt service repayments at 25% export revenues. 
Devaluation: Bs. 2,000-5,000 per US$ (parallel rate: 
6,500); dual exchange rate, treasury subsidising rate of 
Bs.2,000 for 'essential imports'; reduced wage rises. 
Devaluation: Bs. 9,000 (single rate) per US$ (parallel rate: 
17,000); reduced wage rises; min. wage raised to 
Bs. 407,855 (US$20); general wage rise is by factor of 13.55 
relative to Nov. 1983. 
Devaluation: Bs. 9,000-45,000 per US$ (parallel rate: 
160,000); reduced wage rise (bonusof Bs. 3.1 m.) 
Devaluation: Bs. 45,000 - 67,000 per US$ (parallel rate: 
275,000); formal wage indexation restored; min. wage at 
Bs.6.2m. (US$21). 
Secondly, whilst within months the UDP's management of the economy 
was badly 'in drift' by seeking simultaneously (and equally fruitlessly) to 
assuage the IMF and popular pressure, the administration started with a 
clear strategy that was partly misconceived and partly misapplied. This was 
Nov. 1982 
Nov. 1983 
April 1984 
July 1984 
August 1984 
Nov. 1984 
Feb. 1985 
May 1985 
the November 1982 'de-dollarisation', which converted all internal dollar 
obligations at a rate of Bs.145 and lifted state responsiblity for private dollar 
debts as well as the exchange risk of dollar deposits - realised two days later 
with a devaluation to Bs.196. The aim here was to secure governmental con-
trol of all dollar transactions and fortify the peso; this failed almost at once 
as foreign banks closed, local institutions shifted their operations to the 'grey 
market', and private savers conducted their business on the parallel mar-
ket. Confidence in the peso plummetted and the economy was rapidly 'redol-
larised' but now on informal terms with the state entirely lacking control.8 
The legality of this excessively aggressive measure was rejected by the courts 
in 1984, by which time its failure was apparent to all - the government began 
issuing gold and dollar bonds in August of that year - even those members 
of the COB for whom the escala movil (indexation) was the economic 
defence equivalent to that of holding dollars for savers (of whom there were 
a great many with modest deposits who also earned wages and initially sup-
ported the UDP). 
Thirdly, the UDP's much publicised resort to increasing emission of notes 
- characteristic of hyperinflation - should not obscure an equally critical fac-
tor: the collapse of public revenues, which fell from 9% of GDP in 1980 to 
1.3% in the first nine months of 1985.9 Collection time-lags under conditions 
of acute inflation, together with the fact that some three-fifths of central gov-
ernment revenues were related to the official exchange rate, meant that 
income fell faster than expenditure. It has been correctly noted that 
'The hyperinflation under Siles was not so much a result of new spending as 
the inability to restrain spending in the face of falling foreign loans, falling tax 
revenues, and higher debt service payments abroad.'10 
The notion that the UDP was 'spendthrift' is not, then, at all true in the popu-
lar sense of the term - the COB persistently made this point - but it may be 
applied insofar as the government was unprepared or unable - the degree 
varied - fully to pass on the structural and conjunctural costs of the crisis to 
the popular sector either through its own initiatives or by accepting those 
demanded by the banks in return for reducing the external pressure. Once 
the government's effort to control dollar deposits collapsed it simply trod 
water, trying to mediate internal and external pressures only when they 
became absolutely intolerable. (By 1984 the internal limits of tolerance cor-
responded to a general strike of more than a fortnight; the external ones 
extended to the impounding of Lloyd Aereo Boliviano's aged Boeing 707 
at Miami airport). Reductions in public investment were thus preferred to 
those of real wages although the effects were barely slower to emerge and 
would be full exploited by the MNR after 1985. 
The character of the UDP's 'packages' roughly reflects the administra-
tion's political fortunes. Between November 1982 and April 1984 it sought to 
protect real wages although the COB as well as private enterprise (CEPB) 
criticised all the measures of this period, fiercely disputed official assess-
ments of the retail price index, and staged a number of effective strikes at the 
slightest hint of back-sliding by the ministry (see Appendix One). From 
April 1984 to May 1985 the administration openly rejected indexation but 
was obliged at the end of May 1984 to acquiesce in the COB's demand for a 
formal limit on debt service repayments (although inflation was now so great 
that this was of little real consequence other than to harden the attitude of 
the banks, already determined in their opposition as a result of 'de-dollarisa-
tion'). This period also witnessed a series of major strikes - particularly the 
general stoppages of November 1984 and March 1985 - the exceptional dura-
tion of which may be partially attributed to the relatively low real cost of lost 
wages. These destroyed first the UDP's capacity to serve out its term (the 
agreement of 21 November 1984 to advance elections) and then its hopes for 
a respectable election result. The May 1985 restoration of indexation (ag-
reed, but renegued upon, in March) was the most palpable indication by the 
rump of the UDP (now effectively a section of the MNRI and some indepen-
dent technocrats) that it had lost both the economic and political battles and 
would 'retreat in glory', complicating life for its successor. 
The inconsistency of these policies - both in themselves and as a whole -
should not simply be put down to ineptitude or the mesmerism induced by 
the scale of the crisis. It also reflected political divisions within the UDP, 'de-
dollarisation' being essentially a MIR initiative, the 'heterodoxy' of 
November 1983 to May 1985 being largely the product of independent tech-
nicians who tried to move towards the IMF but were forestalled tactically by 
the left, and the 'final fling', a traditional populist gesture in which the small 
clique around Siles, exasperated by rightist criticisms that it had pampered 
the workers, decided to do just that. Equally, while the IMF consistently 
refused to issue its imprimatur for any of the measures, it is noteworthy that 
the November 1982 package - arguably the most coherent and radical of all; 
certainly the most broadly unpopular - was attacked by Banzer for reducing 
real wages and exacting an unacceptable sacrifice from the poor.11 The MNR 
also criticised it - a direct quote is permissible in view of later developments 
- because. 
'it does not respond to popular interests but, rather, to the requirements of the 
IMF.. .it seeks to reduce the level of internal demand, and in order to do this 
uses as an instrument a pitiless reduction in the purchasing power of wages.'12 
In the same vein, following the November 1983 measures, the MNR tabled 
a bill in the lower house to increase wages by 100%, and this was passed in 
the Senate with ADN support (although the CEPB, now aware of the costs 
of political spoiling, reacted with disdain). 
Thus, although an orthodox deflation would certainly have represented a 
surrender of the UDP's programme, the opposition was also fearful of this 
option and was careful not to pronounce it 'the only alternative' until the gov-
ernment's back had been broken in late 1984. This is understandable in polit-
ical terms, but it should be borne in mind that the right, no less than the 
UDP, was apprehensive of the high social costs and threat of disorder; it also 
lacked familiarity with the techniques of managing high inflation (absent 
from Bolivia for the better part of three decades). Moreover, a significant 
entrepreneurial sector stood to lose heavily in terms of both reduced 
speculative opportunities and the inevitable reduction of a public sector 
upon which it was parasitic. To aver, as has one supposed expert, that Boli-
vians were either stupid, forgetful or selfish in failing to embrace orthodoxy 
earlier is to display an unforgivable arrogance.13 There were plenty of people 
- inside the UDP and out - who, by mid-1983, were making technically and 
morally informed judgements as to the relative social and performance 
related costs of inflation and deflation. By the end of that year circumstances 
beyond the UDP's control determined that either could only prevail in acute 
and sustained form. Profoundly inequitable though the former was, its rela-
tive merit - in political terms - was that it was, at least until late 1984, corro-
sive rather than explosive. Pathetic and acquiescent though the govern-
ment's position may appear, it was not simply bred of cowardice, and it 
upheld a shard of its original mandate not to provoke violence, the potential 
for which would be far greater through a decisive 'u-turn' than through an 
entirely new mandate. In this respect, then, electoralism was not simply for-
mally desirable but also - from a managerial perspective - entirely necessary. 
In the end, of course, Siles did deploy troops, and this initiative (March 
1985) undoubtedly prepared the ground for the MNR, which during the 
ensuing election campaign kept its policy options very vague indeed, simply 
repeating the now familiar catechism that an agreement with the IMF was 
essential and more favourable conditions for private capital were the only 
means by which to resolve the crisis.14 Mention should also be made of the 
fact that despite the effective boycott of the UDP by the international banks 
and the IMF, the US government was apparently unwilling to force the Siles 
administration into a corner as resolutely as it had in 1956. This was certainly 
informed by the prospect of a conservative regime and the need to retain 
anti-cocaine operations, but increases in economic and military aid - from 
$19.7 m. in 1982 to $78.1 m. in 1984- also reflect the perception that if the Siles 
government presided over a completely chaotic economy, at least it did so 
through constitutional means and on terms that were in reality barely less dis-
tinct from those demanded by the COB than they were from those espoused by 
Banzer (whom the State Department, at least, did not greatly trust) and eventu-
ally implemented by Paz and Sanchez de Lozada. Demonstration of the costs 
of irresponsibility were best left to the strictly economic domain; any manifestly 
political retribution carried an unnecessarily high price. 
Whether purposefully or perforce heterodox, the UDP's economic 
policies did not enjoy even a brief flourish of success, as for instance did 
those of APR A in Peru. Even the diminished rate of contraction in 1984 may 
be ascribed to the recovery of agriculture after the climatic ravages of the 
previous year - a critical if conjunctural setback. In effect, by October 1982 
the crisis was already too deep-seated and externally-determined to allow 
for remedies that fell short of absolute radicalism. Following the failure of 
'de-dollarisation' - that, in terms of both inflation and exchange rates, took 
nine months to become fully evident (Appendices Three and Four) - the 
UDP was doomed to manage rather than resolve the crisis although it could 
be argued in more precise terms that it was not until the second half of 1984 
that a 'progressive remedy' was completely beyond hope. Certainly, it was 
between September and November 1984 that both the COB and the right 
moved into decisive confrontation with the government and each other, pro-
voking a momentary revival of real wages but also the precipitate calling of 
elections that deprived the regime of any incentive to engage in structural 
remedies. At most, therefore, the UDP's political authority to deal with the 
economy lasted barely 24 months, and it was evident well before November 
1984 that such authority would not resist a major challenge. 
Politics 
The UDP years are widely viewed as a failure of the left both in government and 
outside it. However, as with the economy, the UDP's social policies were 
scarcely radical. Indeed, within three months of coming to power it could be 
said that only the presence of the PCB in the regime upheld any pretence of 
radicalism, sustained more by rhetoric and opposition attacks than by substan-
tive policy. Nevertheless, when, in November 1984, the Communist leader Mar-
cos Domic defended the alliance in a final, futile effort to avert its collapse, he 
could legitimately point to a number of identifiably 'progressive' measures. 
In foreign affairs relations were established with Sandinista Nicaragua and 
re-established with Cuba - a matter of anxiety to the high command, which 
was quick to inspect medical equipment donated by Havana to La Paz's Hos-
pital del Nino on the grounds that it might be used for spying on the Estado 
Mayor General next-door. Relations with the Soviet Union also improved 
(although, to the PCB's chagrin, the government condemned the occupation 
of Afghanistan), yet Siles took a very low profile on Central America as a 
whole. By contrast, an early and unique success was scored with the deten-
tion and extradition to France of Klaus Barbie by an interior ministry that 
promised to be just as competent at such operations as it had been under the 
military. Although at home the government was soon and justifiably seen to 
be weak and inactive in dealing with the extreme right, its image abroad was, 
at least for a while, far more impressive. 
Perhaps the most notable and enduring success of the UDP was its health 
policy, and particularly the establishment of the Comites Populares de Salud, 
which effectively combined a progressive approach to preventative medicine 
with popular mobilisation in a campaign that eliminated polio and dramati-
cally reduced the incidence of measles within two years through the inocula-
tion of three-quarters of all infants. Indeed, despite the strongly collectivist 
thrust of this initiative, the right was obliged to recognise its popularity, and 
promised in the 1985 election campaign to retain the programme. (A 
promise that was technically honoured although in practice the committees 
soon became a conduit for clientism and corruption.) 
If it was only in the field of health that the UDP even approximated to 
what was from its inception (in 1978) an exceptionally vague programme, it 
should be noted that the alliance itself effectively collapsed within weeks of 
coming to office. In formal terms the UDP was finally dissolved in 
December 1984, but it was the departure of the MIR from government in 
January 1983 that damaged the coalition beyond repair. Although the MIR, 
and especially Jaime Paz Zamora, staged this exceptionally early rupture 
primarily for sectarian ends, the plausible ostensible cause was in-fighting 
within the MNRI and the consequent failure to formulate coherent policy 
and eradicate the vestiges of the dictatorship's paramilitary apparatus. 
The MNRI was indeed badly divided and would remain so to the end, the 
desertion of one faction led by Samuel Gallardo giving the opposition con-
trol of both houses of congress by eleven votes in August 1984. By that stage 
dissidence was determined principally by the desire to protect political 
careers, readily achieved by 'rejoining' the MNR, which was ever open to 
erstwhile renegades and sufficiently lax in its interpretation of 'revolutionary 
nationalism' not to cause ideological inconvenience for those who had previ-
ously cavorted with Communists and lambasted Victor Paz - a man who 
harboured grudges with exceptional rancour but dissembled with the affabil-
ity of a political genius. Opportunist though such moves were, they did not 
in reality break anything but the organisational boundaries of the MNRI's 
conduct since the party owed its existence less to a clear programmatic dis-
tinction from its forebear than a different set of allies at home and, to a lesser 
extent, abroad. It revindicated the more progressive features of the 're-
volutionary era' and took a more principled stance on dictatorship, but its 
modus operandi remained very similar to that of the MNR.15 Indeed, this 
shared clientelist inheritance was at the heart of the MNRI's early fissures 
(December 1982 to July 1983) when, shortly after coming to office, there was 
a very public and debilitating controversy over ministerial feudos and access 
to the placid Siles, with further personalist subtractions rapidly proliferating 
around them (Roncal; Velarde; Gallardo). These divisions were not entirely 
concerned with the spoils of office; they also related to treatment of the left, 
the COB and narcotrafico. However, the issues at stake never merited the 
degree of conflict and air of crisis that attended them, and the MNRI singu-
larly failed to provide the discipline and sobriety necessary to contain the 
contagion of politiqueria. Siles's personal involvement tarnished his reputa-
tion, and it is telling that although the MNR later suffered from comparable 
conflicts in government, Victor Paz scrupulously kept himself above them, 
limiting public pronouncements to the absolute minimum required by the 
protocols of office (Quite the reverse of his proclivity for personal attacks in 
previous decades). 
Insofar as such disorganisation within the coalition's senior partner 
affected both the internal temper and external image of the government, it 
damaged the MIR and PCB. Yet the difficulties displayed by these parties 
were by no means reducible to this issue. The MIR came under pressure 
across the board, from initial disputes with the MNRI over appointments in 
the customs service, to limiting the damage caused by 'de-dollarisation' and 
assuaging a rank and file that had suffered sharply under the dictatorship and 
now saw very little effort being made to settle accounts with the 
paramilitaries. Although very loose, the MIR's rhetoric was notably more 
buoyant than that of the MNRI and PCB, and the expectations harboured by 
its generally youthful following, which had waited four years for power, were 
correspondingly higher. Moreover, as vice president, Jaime Paz Zamora was 
closely associated with the administration whilst-true to the traditions of his 
office - lacking even minimal influence over it. For some 15 months it 
appeared as if the MIR was reacting as one to its anomalous position of being 
in the government via Paz Zamora's position and its continuing membership 
of the UDP yet rejecting places in cabinet and acting - at the very best - as 
a fairweather friend in congress and the COB. Its attacks on the 'incoher-
ence' of economic policy enabled the MIR to diminish its association with 
'de-dollarisation' but also obscured a growing split between the party's right 
wing (Paz Zamora; Eid; Capobianco) and the more radical current that was 
itself divided between 'socialists' leaning towards the PCB (Aranibar; Fer-
rufino) and 'syndicalists' identified with the anti-PCB factions within the 
COB (Delgadillo). This process remained unclear for over a year in part sim-
ply because of the very bluntness with which Paz Zamora attacked Siles and 
the cabinet - even when he himself was acting as president during Siles's trips 
abroad - and in part because until mid-1984 the vice president found it easier 
to support anti-government initiatives from the left, notably the FSTMB's 
unilateral imposition of cogestion mayoritaria in Comibol in April 1983, 
which he had the temerity to welcome as a revival of the true traditions of 
1952.16 (It should be noted that this stance had the added advantage for Paz 
Zamora of embarrassing the PCB as well as Siles.) 
Both the MNRI and the PCB justifiably distrusted the MIR's motives 
from the moment it quit the cabinet, not least because this seemed to presage 
a challenge for dominant influence, if not outright power. However, the 
MNRI was in no position to launch a complete assault on the miristas, and 
the Communists disliked their replacement by Christian Democrats and 
independent technocrats as well as maintaining a greater commitment to 
unity than was recognised outside the party at the time. This, together with 
the fact that the MIR continued to enjoy appreciable popular support, 
delayed a complete schism within the UDP and permitted the party's return 
to government in April 1984. Yet the terms of re-entry into the fold rapidly 
revealed the tensions that had been gestating within the party itself. From 
Paz Zamora's perspective there was by this stage nothing more to be gained 
- and indeed quite a bit to be lost - from continuing to act as a 'trojan horse'. 
From the viewpoint of the MIR's radical wing there still remained the possi-
bility of rapprochement between the UDP and the COB based on the initial 
redistributionist policies of the alliance. Cogestion had been obtained in 
Comibol, cogobierno was no longer a viable option, the PCB favoured their 
re-inclusion, and the right's growing challenge might still be resisted. 
Nevertheless, the economic policy agreed by the majority of the cabinet 
following the MIR's return precisely ended indexation and sought to shift 
back to orthodoxy in controlling inflation - a telling fact in the light of 
developments in 1989. As a result, Delgadillo immediately quit both the 
cabinet and the party, establishing MIR-Masas, which would challenge the 
UDP within the COB as part of the Direction Revolucionaria Unificada 
(DRU). The larger radical group led by Antonio Aranibar rejected this line 
as misguided in its aggression towards the PCB and its excessive economism. 
However, if the Aranibar faction appeared to be associated with official 
attacks on 'ultra-leftism', which escalated following the DRU's gaining of 
control of the COB at its sixth congress in September 1984, a second split was 
made inevitable by the polarisation of the final months of that year, the 
irreversible collapse of the UDP in December, and Paz Zamora's clear inten-
tion to stage an electoral campaign based on personalism and a concerted 
retreat from the party's radical heritage. This led, in January 1985, to the for-
mation of the MIR-Bolivia Libre (MBL), which contained some of the 
party's most talented cadre and sought to restore the unity of the left under 
conditions of headlong retreat. The basis for such a recomposition was 
entirely absent prior to the election, the prolonged general strike of March 
1985 exacerbating expectations of dual power through the COB and generat-
ing a fierce debate within the left over the viability of constitutionalism per 
se. 
As befits its traditions, the internal response of the PCB to its participation 
in a chaotic and unpopular coalition was more modulated and less public. In 
terms of collective temperament and ideology the party was better adjusted 
to the vagaries of 'popular frontism'. However, it suffered the consequences 
to an unprecedentedly high degree despite the fact that Bolivian Com-
munism had since its inception been obliged to contend with powerful forces 
to its left. Historically, these had been represented in the syndicalist sphere 
by Juan Lechin Oquendo, whose careering pragmatism easily embraced 
calls for armed struggle and workers' power, and in the political realm by 
Trotskyism; the two had often entered into short but effective 'anti-Stalinist' 
alliances. Under the UDP the Trotskyist threat was in itself of little consequ-
ence. Beyond the university, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) sig-
nally failed to capitalise on popular disenchantment; its clear-headedness 
with regard to the debilities of the local capitalist economy was accompanied 
by a remarkable misconception that the radical form of popular mobilisation 
reflected an equally strong commitment to political revolution. This cardinal 
error of failing to distinguish between appearances and reality was insuffi-
ciently mitigated by explaining several unrealised 'revolutionary situations' 
in terms of the 'absence of leadership' (either a truism or a damning self-
indictment).17 Nonetheless, if the POR had become petrified by sectarian 
propagation, the longstanding Trotskyist heritage had left its mark on a large 
number of activists for whom there appeared to be no alternative other than 
the COB to counteract the PCB's 'collaborationism' and consolidate a 
defence of the working class. Thus, the Communists' problems in controlling 
the ministries of mines and labour throughout this period extended beyond 
a loss in rank and file support in the unions to confronting a radical critique 
of the contradictions of managing a capitalist slump under a proletarian ban-
ner. 
In the first instance conflict took a familiar form through the FSTMB's 
occupation of Comibol (April 1983), which the party leadership first tried to 
avert, then mediate, and finally had shame-facedly to accept and join. After 
all, cogestion had been a leitmotif of the 1952 revolution, was part of the 
PCB's programme, and enjoyed broad support within its principal union 
constituency. Moreover, Simon Reyes, one of the party's most prominent 
leaders, headed the new management structure, which did not in itself dam-
age the popular front strategy and owed more to the autogestionario current 
in the COB than to the party's major political enemies rapidly grouping 
around Lechfn. However, it was not long before what was a containable 
instance of 'workerism' was exacerbated by economic conditions into an 
irresistible militancy over wages. Here the PCB was comprehensively 
defeated by both policy and circumstances. It could not fail to be seen to be 
defending real wages and yet this entailed strike action against a government 
in which it was participating. Moreover, by mid-1984 such strikes were 
patently taking on a politically critical character, incorporating legitimate 
expectations as well as the 'demagogy' assailed by the party. It is, however, 
notable that it was only at the PCB's fifth congress in Febrary 1985 - after the 
UDP had split and the party had left government - that dissidence took open 
form with a group led by Ramiro Barrenechea and based largely on the 
youth movement eventually breaking away in August.18 
The role of the COB under the UDP naturally combined popular discon-
tent over the economy with more politically-motivated initiatives by factions 
of the left for which the organisation has traditionally been the premier site 
of competition. As noted above, one major axis of this conflict was between 
the PCB and Juan Lechin, who struck increasingly radical poses as the rank 
and file lost patience with the government. Although relations between the 
regime and a COB leadership dominated by forces unsympathetic to the 
UDP were fraught throughout and never escaped the cycle of devaluation 
and strike action, they deteriorated beyond repair in September 1984 when 
the 6th congress of the COB produced a clear polarisation between the PCB 
and the DRU, which went out of its way to distance formal support for con-
stitutionalism from backing for the UDP (a 'bourgeois government') and 
continued to insist upon implementation of the COB's emergency plan -
complete default on the external debt, full indexation, curbs on capital, and 
workers' control.19The ensuing 20-day general strike in November produced 
Siles's effective abdication in the Church-sponsored agreement to advance 
elections. 
It was, though, the strike of March 1985 that more profoundly determined 
subsequent developments, since the week-long occupation of La Paz by min-
ers was unparalleled in its scale and appeared to promise a decisive settling 
of accounts amidst incessant discharges of dynamite that traumatised the 
middle class. For several days it appeared that a 'gentlemen's agreement' 
over elections would be swept away by proletarian activism, redolent of 1952 
in its appeal to communitarianism. Whether by design or default, Siles let 
this wave roll unimpeded until it began to lose impetus. The COB leadership 
failed to present any new political proposal and, having already rejected the 
offer of cogobierno as a reheated trick of the 1950s, resolutely resisted any 
more radical option, for which it was even less prepared. Thus, although a 
state of virtual dual power prevailed for nigh-on two weeks, this corres-
ponded almost entirely to the stamina of the rank and file, prepared to face 
down the government for pay and denounce elections as useless but not to 
take state power. When the troops were deployed without major conflict the 
true limits of syndicalism were exposed. The end of the 'jornadas de marzo' 
produced the single most emphatic deflation of the popular movement and 
the left. Mass mobilisation had not so much failed as demonstrated its essen-
tially conservative character and thus a vulnerability which the right hence-
forth felt able to exploit by challenging the COB to 'showdowns' where the 
unions lacked an endgame. 
In political terms the intransigence of the COB leadership stemmed from 
an acute axiety to avert the compromises sprung on it by the MNR in the 
1950s. This had instilled such a dedication to organisational independence 
that the syndicalist vanguard not only held to devices - escala mdvil and 
cogestion mayoritaria - that optimised its distance from the regime but also 
preferred the risks of constant conflict to those of a social pact. These 
instincts were further deepened by prolonged experience of resistance to dic-
tatorship that had enlivened skills of agitation but dulled those of negotia-
tion needed to realise gains from it. Such proclivities had become 
ideologised less into a discourse of anarcho-syndicalism - although this lay 
close to the surface - than into a simultaneous celebration and denial of the 
limits of economism. The political forces seeking control of the COB fell 
prey to the slogans of its 'apolitical maximalism', either by stoking up expec-
tations they could not meet (DRU) or by seeking to fulfil them at a 
'capitulationist level' (PCB/Escobar). This, of course, is a general pattern, 
but the political and economic circumstances prevailing in Bolivia between 
1982 and 1985 gave it decisive importance within national political life. 
The impasse reached in March 1985 was broken in the elections of July, 
and converted into defeat by decree 21060, driving the left from the centre 
of politics and transforming what had hitherto been consequential debates 
over strategy into esoteric theoretical disputes. However, the objective 
dilemmas and difficulties encountered during the UDP period were clearly 
immense, and the failure to resolve them outside of slogans reflected the 
degree of popular pressure on the left no less than it did the political 
shortcomings of the principal parties. Indeed, in terms of incidence, popular 
mobilisation continued at an equal - and occasionally higher - rate under the 
MNR (see Chronology), suggesting that the left was responsible less for 
bringing people onto the streets than for orchestrating them once they were 
there, which was very often. Such matters are exceptionally hard to quantify, 
but it is telling that between October 1983 and June 1984 - 'quiet' at a 
national level by dint of the fact that there was only one 24-hour general 
strike - there was a total of 554 officially registered industrial or social 'con-
flicts'.20 
Urban stoppages and conflicts dominated, but one key feature of this 
period was increased recourse by campesinos to road-blocks (bloqueos), 
which were highly effective, required a relatively slight physical presence, 
and could not readily be countered except through force, which the UDP 
only employed with the utmost reluctance. In 1983 and 1984 there were 18 
major bloqueos, which, following the example first set in opposition to the 
1979 Natusch coup, both strengthened the confidence of the CSUTCB and 
its allied katarista currents and also suggested that the political imbalance 
between town/mine and countryside was being rectified. In some sense this 
was true. Even after three decades of urbanisation the rural population 
remained substantial and could swing an election - a matter of unpre-
cedented importance. Equally, the decline - soon to be collapse - of mining 
and the expansion of cocaine had already begun a process of migration to 
and within certain rural areas (notably from the Altiplano to the Chapare) 
and greatly enhanced both the value of coca production and the resolution 
with which it had to be defended (see below). Moreover, whilst it was to be 
some time before the experience of Sendero Luminoso in Peru was recog-
nised to be a major phenomenon, fears of this example imbricating with a 
resurgent rural radicalism were harboured beyond the ranks of the military. 
Yet these factors did not so much underlie a progressive polarisation in the 
campo as reflect a reduction in political control. As in the urban sector, 
mobilisation and direct action were aggressive but limited in their objec-
tives; caudillismo and localism continued to prevail (one reason for the large 
number of incidents), and if the parameters of the 'limited good' were palp-
ably being eroded, they were still tighter than the right feared and the left 
hoped. Although the fact is often greatly exaggerated, inflation did pre-
judice rural labour less profoundly than urban workers; the drought of 1983 
bred more survivalism than subversion; and the UDP's chaotic efforts at 
cooptation through 'cogestion' (CORACA) increased bureaucratic in-fight-
ing. The end result was sufficient discontent and activism to maintain politi-
cal uncertainty in the countryside, but not enough for this to alter the 
balance of power at the national level. The MNR old-guard, well aware that 
a similar situation had obtained prior to the coup of 1964, subsequently took 
the line of least resistance, excluding the countryside from its initial tax 
reforms and delaying introduction of modifications to the 1953 agrarian 
reform proposed by their technocrats. They still did not escape trouble, but 
it is probable that this would have been much more serious if the UDP 
experience had not clearly signalled a threat that had been obscured for sev-
eral years by military government. 
Conservative victories in the polls of 1985 and 1989 have led many com-
mentators and the right itself to overemphasise the degree to which it altered 
its modus operandi prior to the collapse of the UDP. Whilst it is certainly the 
case that both the COB and the parties of the radical left underestimated the 
degree and ramifications of conservative compliance with constitutionalism, 
their failure either to modulate a manichaean vision bred of two decades of 
dictatorship or to move beyond a fundamentally cautious and defensive 
acceptance of liberal democracy was not solely the result of ingrained cus-
tom. Banzer's establishment of the ADN and acceptance of defeat in the 
polls of 1979 and 1980 signalled an important shift, but this had not forestal-
led the coups of Natusch and Garcia Mesa, and leading adenistas served 
these military regimes. Equally, although the US response to militarism after 
1979 was more aggressive than in any other South American country, 
Washington's influence was far from decisive, and recidivist golpistas con-
tinued to agitate throughout the UDP period. The degree of their isolation 
is much more readily appreciated with hindsight than it was at the time. The 
kidnapping of Siles in June 1984 by elements of his bodyguard and the elite 
UMOPAR police unit; the 'passive mutiny' by the staff college in 
Cochabamba against General Sejas for four months in mid-1984; and the 
abortive rebellion by General Olvis at the end of the year all underscored the 
fragility of the constitutionalist entente at a time when military dissidence 
was breaking cover in Argentina and popular mobilisation against the 
Pinochet regime in Chile had been forced into retreat. 
In each instance both the COB and the majority of the left rallied to the 
defence of the constitution, curbing their offensive against the government. 
Nonetheless, this desistance from escalating tension in the face of open right-
ist threats was paralleled by a deep suspicion of reactionary manoeuvres to 
subvert democratic institutions from within. Denunciations of 'golpes con-
stitucionales' often reflected reluctance to accept the new rules of gover-
nance, but they were not always baseless, especially once the relationship 
between Siles and Paz Zamora became antagonistic and opened the possibil-
ity (March and November 1983) of a 'formal succession', which had in the 
past been a mechanism for altering governments (1925; 1934; 1949). Eventu-
ally, of course, the UDP administration was terminated by an even more 
overt dispensation with the letter of the 1967 Constitution, against which the 
left was poorly positioned to complain partly because much of it had called 
for fresh elections in 1982, partly because the November 1984 accord was 
signed by all the major political forces and arbitrated by the Church, and in 
part because there now existed widespread support for any resolution of the 
stalemate. The right certainly helped to contrive such a situation by insisting 
on the impeachment of Siles's senior official Rafael Otazo 
over his discussions with the narcotraficante Roberto Suarez, by threatening 
to impeach Siles himself, and by effectively vetoing the president's amnesty 
for a handful of leftists captured by the army in the village of Luribay in 
unclear circumstances and given jail sentences the harshness of which con-
trasted with the absence of any judicial action over scores of well publicised 
cases on the right. Indeed, if under the UDP attention remained focused on 
the relationship between a debilitated executive and an aggressive legisla-
ture, the interested immobility of the judiciary was a factor of consequence 
well before the disorganised efforts to replicate application of the rule of law 
in the neighbouring republics with the 'trial' of Garcia Mesa from 1986. 
Siles's eventual recourse to his traditional tactic of hunger strike in October 
1984 signalled an incapacity to secure even a minimum degree of coopera-
tion between the powers of the state, where vested interests remained excep-
tionally strong even if they had been obliged to adhere to institutional pro-
tocols and the strategem of non-compliance. 
The nature of Siles's response to his embattlement greatly facilitated the 
intervention of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which constituted a peculiar 
amalgam of the first and fourth estates in that its appreciable authority was 
expressed through the country's leading daily Presencia, under the director-
ship of the conservative (and soon to be disgraced) Monsenor Genaro Prata, 
and its premier radio station Fides, dominated by the astute anti-communist 
Jesuit Jose Gramunt. Both stuck strenuously to the liberal voice that had 
been developed under the banzerato and lay at the core of their legitimacy, 
but the editorial impetus towards 'concertaciori was vital to sealing Siles's 
fate in that it provided a non-partisan imprimatur for the less high-minded 
horse-trading immediately dubbed as the 'golpe eclesiastico' by the left. 
The clergy remained politically divided, but the radical current was poorly 
represented in an aged hierarchy exhausted by its remonstrations over 
human rights under Banzer and Garcia Mesa and preoccupied with adminis-
tering aid and charity programmes amongst the poor, who continued to con-
centrate their political activity within the orbit of secular organisations. This 
general pattern - closer to that of Argentina and Peru than Chile and Brazil 
at that time - deserves a far fuller analysis than is possible here, but mention 
should be made of the historically weak position of Christian Democracy, 
which had suffered an early and decisive division in the 1960s and proved 
incapable of expanding a small confessional constituency. Although the 1988 
papal visit witnessed some of the most robust language ever employed by 
John Paul II on the social question, this reflected the relatively low level of 
clerical radicalism, the exceptionally severe impact of the MNR's deflatio-
nary policies, and a justified perception that the Church no longer faced a 
challenge from marxism. After November 1984 the good offices of the hierar-
chy were largely limited to the resolution of sectoral conflicts and almost exc-
lusively directed towards obtaining a modicum of moderation from the gov-
ernment - a role to which it was accustomed and which bore little political 
risk. 
The adroit use of congress by the right took the traditional form of obstruc-
tionism. Although there were very few precedents of a conservative legisla-
ture assailing a more progressive executive - certainly nothing of the order 
witnessed in Chile under Allende - conflict between these two arms of the 
state had arisen in the late 1950s through intra-MNR faction-fighting, re-
emerging in 1979-80. The MNR and ADN now stole a leaf from the left's 
book to stage a series of censures, impeachments and procedural obstacles 
that were sanctioned by law and required the UDP to govern by decree-law 
and ordinance within months of coming to office. No instance was in itself of 
critical consequence, but the accumulated effect was to cast the government 
in an unconciliatory light and strengthen the identification of the right with 
the strict letter of the law. It may be doubted that a great many electors took 
this to be more than self-serving politiqueria of the old school. Still, the cam-
paign increased from mid-1984 when the opposition won a majority in con-
gress and immediately turned it to sharp effect with prosecution of the 
Otazo scandal, which significantly damaged the moral standing of Siles and 
the MNRI, if not the UDP as a whole. 
The manipulation of this affair combined unremarkable hypocrisy - in 
1988 senior members of the ADN were revealed to be in close and friendly 
contact with Suarez - with a more novel exploitation of the media, particu-
larly television. Here it is worth noting that the parallel existence of wide-
spread popular access to television and competitive politics had only previ-
ously existed in 1979-80, when the state possessed an effective monopoly 
over broadcasting (the few, disorganised, university stations being closed to 
the right). By 1984 this position had changed sufficiently for the right to 
launch telling attacks on the regime across the board, from the press, where 
the UDP possessed no popular journal and was supported by none (even the 
weekly Aqui was critical from the left), to the radio, where the proliferation 
of independent stations diminished the impact of pro-regime broadcasting, 
to television, where the poor quality of the state channel and chaotic condi-
tions of the university stations provided a commercial as well as political 
logic to the emergence of a private sector. Although this only came to 
flourish with complete - albeit semi-legal - deregulation under the MNR, 
when La Paz enjoyed the dubious benefits of six channels, during the last 
year of the UDP it expanded public access to the constitutional process. 
Moreover, it provided the right with the capacity to address a mass consti-
tuency that did not read the press or attend the relatively few rallies held by 
conservative parties. (The MNR remained a 'closed' and cell-based organi-
sation whilst the ADN's more frequent public events were dominated by its 
youth and tended to be aggressive). In the process, conservative politicians 
acquired new rhetorical skills, replacing the customary injunctions to sac-
rifice with a preparedness to field direct questions and engage in frank inter-
views. The results were not always impressive - Banzer remained a notably 
poor speaker - but television coverage undoubtedly assisted the 1985 elec-
tion victory and laid the ground for much more concerted exploitation of the 
medium thereafter. The left, attached to the culture of mass meetings and 
pamphleteering, lagged badly even when it possessed access. 
The importance of television as an effective 'journal of record' as well as the 
primary medium for political exchange was reflected by the attention given to 
the televised political forum of May 1985 organised by the CEPB. This event, 
which in the past would have taken place in the university (with the attendant 
disputes over access to the right), ratified the emergence of the entrepreneurs' 
corporate association as a major political actor, signalling a 'new right' that 
subsequently gained considerable influence - but not outright dominance -
in the conservative governments of Paz Estenssoro and Paz Zamora. 
Prior to 1982 the CEPB had operated principally as a lobby group and had 
a lower profile than that of the private mine-owners' Asociacion Nacional de 
Mineros Medianos (ANMM), which, along with the ganaderos of the Beni 
and commercial farmers of Santa Cruz, campaigned on a sectoral basis 
rather than through regional chambers of commerce. The CEPB's rapid rise 
to prominence under the leadership of Fernando Illanes may be attributed 
to a number of factors. First, when the UDP entered office it was far from 
clear that the MNR would consistently support the interests of private capi-
tal, and while the ADN was far more reliable in this respect, its political pros-
pects did not look particularly good. Secondly, the inclusion of the PCB in 
the government and the high profile taken by the COB engendered a 
genuine fear of expanded state intervention. Thirdly, the rapid deterioration 
of the economy damaged many productive businesses. Fourthly, low expec-
tations of military intervention prompted local business to 'go public' where 
previously it would have negotiated with officers behind the scenes. This had 
the added advantage of demonstrating the CEPB's 'civic responsibility', and 
it tended to give more prominence to the positive promulgation of capitalist 
'common sense' than to simple expressions of anti-communism, although 
this was certainly not lacking. 
Finally, it has been suggested that economic developments over the previ-
ous decade had encouraged the emergence of a 'new entrepreneur' - a 
beneficiary of the expansion of agro-business and cheap credit under 
Banzer, bolstered by the relative strengthening of private mining (ANMM) 
and banking (ASOBAN), better educated and less overtly 'political' than 
the generation that had arisen in the 1950s in the penumbra of the MNR's 
short-lived but extremely powerful Celula de Importadores. It should be 
stressed that this interpretation is based on only impressionistic evidence 
and may easily be qualified on a range of points, but it is far from implaus-
ible. Leading figures such as Illanes, the Sanchez de Lozada brothers and 
Ronald Maclean were by no means 'apolitical' - Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada 
(MNR) and Maclean (ADN) were highly active militants of their parties -
but they presented themselves first and foremost as entrepreneurs.22 Rela-
tively young, bilingual and university educated (usually in the US), they 
eschewed the customary reticence of local businessmen, and possessed 
strong ties with both foreign capital and professional economists. Moreover, 
all shared a commitment to neo-liberalism, which by no means enjoyed abso-
lute hegemony within the CEPB but had considerable external academic 
and political support, particularly from Chile, where these groups had 
longstanding links. Extreme caution should be exercised in viewing 
these attributes with relation to interpretative models for the restructuring 
of other South American political economies in the 1970s, not least because 
that of Bolivia was qualitatively smaller and more backward as well as being 
chronically dependent upon revenue from an illegal export. Indeed, it is indi-
cative that the MNR's Nueva Politica Econ6mica (NPE) was devised by a 
Harvard professor (Jeffrey Sachs) and directed by a local businessman who 
had spent much of his life in the US (Sanchez de Lozada). 
As has been noted, neo-liberalism was not rapidly embraced by either the 
ADN or the MNR, which initially preferred the short-term rewards of berat-
ing the UDP for failing to maintain real wages. However, by November 1984 
it was clear that the economy would be the most important issue in an elec-
tion that the right was almost certain to win. Heterodoxy had manifestly 
failed; true 'shock' had not been attempted since 1956; resumption of rela-
tions with the IMF and international creditors had become a priority after 
March 1984; and the internal opposition to deflation had already exhausted 
its political resources in combatting a less than radical variant. The principal 
problem was the adoption and propagation of a mercantilist ideology capa-
ble of resisting the inevitable backlash under democratic conditions. Neither 
the (distant) memory of the 1956-57 stabilisation nor the more recent experi-
ence of stability under Banzer provided sufficient conditions for this, 
although the former undoubtedly recommended the policy to significant sec-
tors of both parties. In the event, the very scale of the crisis compelled the 
taking of an option that provoked widespread dissent, could only be realised 
through the use of force, and depended upon narcoddlares for its success. 
The MNR-ADN Alliance, August 1985-1989 
Within a fortnight of assuming office in August 1985 the government of Vic-
tor Paz Estenssoro gave Bolivians a new phrase - 'veintiuno zero sesentd -
that was henceforth to occupy a central place in the lexicon of both daily life 
and politics. Decreee 21060, introduced on 29 August, set a regional prece-
dent for rapid and dramatic stabilisation measures adopted by incoming 
administrations. (The examples of Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela and 
Menem in Argentina, both in 1989, most clearly follow the pattern.) 
Nowhere else in Latin America, however, were the results so emphatic and 
enduring - the very reason why this decree, alone of all republican ordi-
nances (including those for the nationalisation of the mines and agrarian 
reform in October 1952 and August 1953 respectively), is known by its 
number of issue, which soon acquired a status akin to that of an alchemic for-
mula to celebrants and detractors alike. For the government the decree was 
but the first - if the most vital - step of a 'New Economic Policy', but this 
term never achieved popular resonance, perhaps because it inferred a 
superior modernity for the many whom it prejudiced and who were less 
impressed by the stabilisation it brought to prices than by the acute contrac-
tion in jobs and welfare that accompanied it. The results of this were, as the 
authors of the policy readily admitted, conducive to existential instability 
and a substantial reduction in the standard of living - neither of which was 
properly measured or reflected in official statistics. 
Although Decree 21060 will undoubtedly dominate both the formal his-
tory and popular memory of the 1985-89 government, it was not, of course, 
the sole issue of consequence - even in the economic sphere, where the col-
lapse of the international tin price in October 1985 and continued narcot-
rafico had a major impact. The axis of political life shifted substantially to the 
right but despite the relative solidity of the MNR-ADN alliance until the 
final months of the Paz Estenssoro government, politics was by no means 
stagnant. The trial of Garcia Mesa; increasing collaboration by the MIR with 
the administration; the emergence of a 'cholo populism' headed by Carlos 
Palenque; and the holding in 1987 of the first municipal elections since 1949 
all interacted closely with popular discontent over stabilisation and its atten-
dant reductions of real wages and public expenditure to make public life both 
charged and unpredictable. Such conflict was no longer determined by the 
'ultimatumist tests' of both policy and institutionalism witnessed under the 
UDP. Yet it signalled that, however widespread popular resignation and 
debilitated the mass organisations, activism remained vital and could not be 
ignored in either the formulation or implementation of official policy. 
The Economy 
Sanchez de Lozada's prescription for economic recovery was one of 
orthodox neo-liberalism. Under Decree 21060 he sought to obtain a 'realis-
tic' exchange rate, decrease the public sector wage bill, free almost all prices, 
and lift most restrictions on financial operations, including those on dollar 
transactions. Through Decree 21369 (July 1986) he effectively opened up the 
economy to full external competition by imposing a uniform import tariff of 
20%. In March 1986 the government introduced a major tax reform to 
enhance state revenue. In August of that year (Decree 21377) Comibol was 
'decentralised' as a first step towards privatisation; in June 1987 the Caja 
Nacional de Seguro Social (CNSS) was deprived of many of its central wel-
fare functions. In March 1988 the government declared the 'decentralisation' 
of the Corporation Boliviana de Fomento (CBF) to regional development 
corporations, and also attempted to devolve responsibility for education to 
local authorities. 
Only some of these policies registered success in their own terms, but all 
were undertaken with the clear objective of maintaining tight control of the 
money supply and eradicating the fiscal deficit so as to restore finance flows 
from the IMF and foreign banks. Although these institutions had long urged 
both monetarist and free market policies, the Paz Estenssoro government 
adopted such policies of its own volition, and only later (March 1986) sought 
external support. The Sanchez de Lozada team was convinced of the merits 
of 'shock', determined to rectify the fiscal crisis in short order, and enter-
tained few doubts as to the methods for 'restructuring'. Although the Fondo 
Social de Emergencia (FSE) was established in December 1985, and 'reacti-
vation' of the economy formally begun under Decree 21660 of July 1987, the 
former was but a minor palliative and the latter remained moribund.23 
Despite protestations to the contrary in the period prior to the 1989 poll, the 
real thrust of economic management from August 1985 was towards deflatio-
nary stabilisation. This was affected in contradictory fashion by both the col-
lapse of the tin price - which facilitated the break-up of Comibol but had a 
profoundly adverse effect on both export and fiscal revenue - and the con-
tinuation of narcotrdfico - which provided an important source of dollars 
and 'informal' employment, alleviating some of the rigours of contraction, 
but also bolstering regional inflation and prejudicing US aid. In broad terms 
it is difficult to deny that the cocaine trade (see below) provided a critical sup-
port for stabilisation, and many account it a decisive factor, certainly off-set-
ting the recession in mining. Nevertheless, proper weight should be given to 
the radicalism of government policy and the resolution with which its core 
elements were implemented. 
The heart of Decree 21060 and its immediate impact lay in exchange rate 
policy. Here Sanchez de Lozada produced a de facto devaluation of the order 
of 93% by unifying overnight the official and informal rates for the dollar. 
The official rate was subsequently allowed to float through the mechanism of 
daily dollar auctions by the Central Bank (BCB). Between December 1985 
and February 1986 internal MNR disputes over the degree of contraction 
this was causing led to some relaxation in control of money supply with the 
result that the now legal informal rate began to rise faster. However, this was 
rapidly curbed, and thereafter the official rate shadowed that on the open 
market sufficiently closely for the general effect to be one of parity. (Appen-
dix Three gives the monthly figures through to February 1986, when the dif-
ferential became a matter of minimal consequence. Formal reform of the 
currency took place in January 1987, when the Boliviano replaced one mill-
ion pesos.)24 
The essential corollary to the unification of the exchange rates was a freeze 
on all public sector wages at pre-devaluation rates. Although the important 
and complex system of bonuses was consolidated into the basic wage, the 
impact of this measure was extremely severe. At the same time, indexation 
and the minimum wage were abolished in both public and private spheres, 
and legal curbs on redundancy were greatly relaxed. By the first half of 1986 
total real wages had fallen to less than two-thirds of their level of the previ-
ous year (Appendix Six), those in the public sector being significantly lower. 
Moreover, the state wage bill was further diminished by the 'voluntary retire-
ment' of public sector workers as a result of the massive reduction in real pay. 
The number of state employees fell by at least 10% within 12 months, the 
impact being sharpest in rural education, where perhaps 25,000 teachers 
left their posts.25 
The liberalisation of prices that accompanied the fluctuation of the 
exchange rate produced an immediate increase in inflation as previously 
compressed prices rose to their 'real' levels. In September 1985 inflation was 
still at 57% per month. But in October inflation became negative as demand 
all but disappeared and the collapse of the COB's resistance made it plain 
that wage compensation would not be conceded. Notwithstanding the flurry 
of official nerves (bitterly opposed by Sanchez de Lozada) at the end of the 
year, the enforced contraction of the economy was secured. In 1986 GDP 
decreased by nearly 3%, the per capita level by nearly 6%. Overall growth 
thereafter oscillated between 2% and 3% - that is, barely retrieving the 1984 
level - whereas per capita growth continued to be negative in 1987, and 
barely exceeded zero in 1988. In 1987 formal exports stood at 60% of the 
1980 level and were well below those registered under the UDP; reductions 
in imports proved extremely hard to achieve - narcodollars undoubtedly 
playing a part - but a trade balance was finally reached in 1988. This did not, 
however, produce a significant amelioration in the levels of un- and under-
employment generated by stabilisation. The first rose almost instantane-
ously to 20% whilst the second - in many respects more indicative of the 
health of an economy such as Bolivia's - touched 60%.26 By the end of the 
government the official level of open unemployment stood at 11.5%, but the 
real level was undoubtedly several points higher - probably 15% - whilst 
underemployment had been reduced by a smaller margin. 
The central objective of Decree 21060 to eliminate the fiscal deficit was 
pursued equally vigorously in terms of revenue and expenditure. Aside from 
the ordained and de facto reductions in the state payroll, a freeze was 
imposed on all public investment, tight controls placed on financial manage-
ment, and ceilings on prices either lifted or removed altogether. Here the 
impact was most marked in the case of the state oil company, YPFB, the 
price of oil and its derivatives being raised from one day to the next by a fac-
tor of seven to slightly above international prices. Whilst this contributed to 
the immediate post-stabilisation inflation rate, it enabled YPFB to meet all 
its tax liabilities and thereby become the principal source of public revenue 
under the MNR, its contribution to the treasury rising from 12.7% of the 
total in 1983 to 56.7% in 1986.27 
Exchange rate unification depended upon 're-dollarisation' - either 
directly or through indexation - of domestic accounts and the lifting of all but 
basic fiscal controls over the banking sector. A key factor in this regard was 
the maintenance of an open 'dollar window' permitting the circulation of 
narco-dollars. This legalisation of the 'grey market' undoubtedly bolstered 
the banks, which also benefitted from processing tax payments and other 
state transactions. However, the new financial climate did little to suppress 
existing illegal or foolhardy customs with respect to loans, resulting in a 
number of collapses and closures as well as the withdrawal, in September 
1987, of the banks' responsibility for administering 'reactivation funds'. On 
the other hand, the government proved more resolute and successful in 
removing a particularly powerful 'union mafia' from the BCB, restoring a 
semblance of sobriety to a nominally independent institution which had 
effectively been beyond the control of its directorate (and the government) 
for a number of years. 
The introduction of the uniform import tariff at 20% took place nearly a 
year after Decree 21060, and since to all intents and purposes it opened the 
borders to foreign commodities, it was predictably criticised by the Camara 
de Industrias. However, the Camara was a weak lobby and could not win 
support from the CEPB. Moreover, exporters were provided a modicum of 
help through a 10% rebate on their inputs. In fact, in 1986 manufacturing 
industry registered its first positive growth for nearly a decade, having 
experienced a much deeper and earlier contraction than any other sector. 
After being driven to the wall by inefficiency, contraband, extremely high 
interest rates, and formidable foreign competition, a very small and back-
ward industrial sector now began to exploit the suppression of wages, open 
labour market, and the appreciable spare capacity left by the recession. 
The dismantling of barriers to external trade was clearly signalled in 
August 1985, and by March 1986 the government had already secured the 
basis upon which to reopen relations with the IMF through the first stand-by 
loan agreement in the better part of a decade. In June the Club of Paris 
agreed to terms for renewed repayment of the external debt that, if not 
exactly as bountiful as the government claimed, were less onerous than some 
feared. This accord laid the basis for later and much-publicised purchases of 
debt on the discount market as well as a controversial 'debt for nature' swap. 
What had initially seemed a strange - even ambitious - step by Sanchez de 
Lozada and Jeffrey Sachs (who harboured no amity for the banks) to 
administer the purge on their own first and then petition for help from the 
banks proved viable. 
It is notable that agreement with the IMF was secured two days before 
Congress approved the 1986/7 budget - the first time in more than two 
decades that this process had been undertaken. Both the Fund and the gov-
ernment were determined that there should be absolute compliance with 
budgetary limits, particularly by the state corporations, which had a very 
long history of exceeding their allocations from the treasury and were the 
principal source of official debt. In 1986 congress agreed to a fiscal deficit of 
$175 million, or 6% of GDP. In fact, so efficient were the government's con-
straints that the year ended with a deficit of only 4% of GDP, which must 
have been the cause of as much shock as gratification in Washington; the 
pupils were proving more zealous than their masters. Henceforth the govern-
ment attempted, with partial success, to limit adjustments in public sector 
wages to the budget, but although this acquired unprecedented importance 
in terms of policy, it failed to become a dominant feature in broader political 
life, probably because it ceded very little in exceptionally straitened times. 
In 1986 the budget certainly attracted far less popular attention than did 
the tax reform of May which had already been agreed with the IMF. This 
measure introduced a property tax and a value-added tax on consumption 
(initially set at 10%). Although both the MNR and ADN had been quick to 
scupper the UDP's efforts at fiscal reform, it was evident that Decree 21060 
needed substantial administrative and legislative supplementation if govern-
ment revenue was to regain a measure of reliability. Between 1978 and 1983 
the ratio of central government taxes to GDP had declined from 11.5% to 
2.8%, not least because of collection time-lags in inflationary times. To over-
see the new schemes the government established a separate fiscal ministry, 
but this was soon reintegrated with that of finance, and collection - but not 
assessment - was farmed out to the private banks. In 1986 all taxes rose to 
13% of GDP, and by 1988 they stood at 17.5%; in the same period internal 
revenue taxes increased from 3.2% to 6.3% of GDP.28 However, this rather 
impressive scenario should be seen in the light of the fact that between 1986 
and 1988 the proportion of central government revenue derived from these 
taxes rose from 24% to 36% whilst the share provided by YPFB remained at 
over 50%. Indeed, the Paz government's policy of 'liberating' the corpora-
tion's prices and enforcing its strict compliance with fiscal obligations meant 
that at the end of the decade YPFB's share of treasury revenue was roughly 
four time higher than at its start. (In the same period taxes on mining fell 
from 16% to 0.4%.) 
Fiscal recovery, then, relied more heavily upon the freeing of prices in a 
single strategic sector than upon reform. In this regard it should be noted 
that the majority of urban Bolivians use cannister gas for cooking and were 
thus directly hit by YPFB's price hikes - a fact made abundantly clear by the 
frequent impromptu bloqueos of streets by consumers whose empty contain-
ers provided most useful impedimenta. Equally, it is of no little consequence 
that the new property tax was not applied in the countryside, where there 
were well supported demonstrations against the reform in June 1986 after 
the government agreed only to delay implementation for one year. Renewed 
protests in October 1987 forced a further delay, and in April 1988 (Decree 
21923) small rural properties were formally excluded from the new regime. 
However, the 1989 budget restored provision despite the fact that no enforce-
ment took place in an election year. 
This official nervousness was not misplaced since in both the altiplano and 
the valleys there were tangible indications that the proposed tax was sus-
pected of heralding an attack on the agrarian reform of 1953. For many this 
was more of a concern than the direct financial impact, although the contrac-
tion of agriculture throughout the MNR government did not bode well in 
that respect either. Indeed, it may not be fanciful to suggest that core sec-
tions of the campesinado viewed the proposal as similar to the measures of 
the tyrant Mariano Melgarejo, whose 'free market' legislation laid the basis 
for a concerted offensive against communal lands in the last third of the 
nineteenth century. Here one might also note that, immediately upon com-
ing to office, the MNR tried to levy a forced loan, which was the standard fis-
cal mechanism of the last century. This measure was opposed - for sound 
political reasons - by the ADN, and was eventually rejected by congress in 
January 1986, not to be heard of again. 
The MNR was, in fact, planning to alter the structure of highland agricul-
ture in particular, and in September 1988 it tabled before congress an agra-
rian development law that proposed, albeit in very vague terms, the reduc-
tion of the minifundia that had been propagated by the 1953 reform. These 
were correctly depicted as diminishing the overall efficiency of production. 
Yet if arguments based on economies of scale were irrefutable within the por-
tals of the ministry and its think-tanks, they stood to cut very little ice indeed 
with those beneficiaries of the reform for whom title was sacrosanct and 
economic rationality only partly dependent upon input-output ratios. The 
legislation was withdrawn in January 1989, presumably because it 
threatened to jeopardise the MNR campaign for the May election. What-
ever the reason, the government could scarcely afford to aggravate the prob-
lems it was already experiencing in the coca zones, and since Victor Paz had 
relied heavily upon the peasantry in the 1950s and early 1960s as a counter-
weight to the miners and left, he would have been acutely aware of the impor-
tance of retaining at least a neutral constituency in the countryside. (In the 
event, on the basis of a calculation limited to the results of provincias - that 
is, all votes except those of departmental capitals - the MNR narrowly won 
the 1989 poll in the countryside from the MIR with 165,800 votes against 
156,900, but it did not come first in any highland department and was forced 
into a poor third position in rural La Paz.) In 1985 the MNR had campaigned 
under the somewhat strange slogan of 'agropoder\ which appeared to be 
equally addressed to the subsistence/local market and lowland agro-export 
sectors. However, little was heard of this catchphrase after 29 August and, 
following recovery from El Nino in 1984 and 1985, the recession in agricul-
ture (most of coca and all of cocaine excepted) remained more consistent 
than in any other sector of the economy. 
The crisis in mining was more acute and widely publicised because of the 
traditional importance of minerals to exports and central government 
revenue and the fact that progressive decline in the first part of the decade 
was rapidly brought to a head by the collapse of the tin price (Appendix 
Five). Although this affected both public and private sectors, the immediate 
impact on Comibol was by a wide margin the most severe because of its size, 
relative inefficiency and simultaneous vulnerability to external pressure and 
direct state intervention. Between 1985 and 1987 both were applied without 
quarter, with the result that approximately 23,000 workers of a total labour 
force of 28,000 were made redundant, the core tin complex of Siglo XX-
Catavi all but mothballed, total production scythed to a fifth of the levels of 
the 1970s, and public sector exports halted altogether for a year.29 It is here 
that one encounters the single most important factor in the decline in legal 
exports that was, in fact, more pronounced than that witnessed under the 
UDP: from $827.7 million in 1982 to $759.6 million in 1984 against a fall from 
$665.4 million in 1985 to $580.6 million in 1988. 
Although the government formally 'decentralised' Comibol into regional 
enterprises (Decree 21377, August 1986), the ministry retained direct control 
over trelocalizacion\ which was too large and conflictive an issue to be man-
aged by small and effectively bankrupt holding companies dedicated to 
maintaining plant and administering the sale of easily realisable assets to the 
private sector. (This was also the case with YPFB, where central control was 
formally stronger and worker resistance to lay-offs more effective). 
Throughout the regime the FSTMB and individual plant unions battled over 
both closures and the terms of redundancy, proffering plans to maintain pro-
duction and seeking to buy certain camps. However, with the partial excep-
tion of the Huanuni mine, the strike was now an impotent weapon and the 
rank and file divided over whether to defend jobs or fight for the best condi-
tions in surrendering them; this became the central issue dividing the union, 
the first option generally being supported by the more political currents 
whilst the second was increasingly favoured by independents whose com-
rades were often voting with their feet out of resignation.30 As pits were for-
mally closed, pulperias left unsupplied, and funds for ComiboPs schools and 
clinics cut off, the diaspora of miners and their families to the cities - princi-
pally El Alto and Cochabamba - and the Chapare marked a watershed in the 
country's industrial history. Even the gradual recovery of the tin price at the 
end of the decade did little to reverse this process, most of the upturn in pro-
duction occurring within the private sector. 
Whereas decentralisation in Comibol and YPFB amounted to little more 
than an ideologically convenient fiction, this policy had a sharp impact when 
applied (March 1988) to the management of the departmental development 
corporations, education and health. The corporations inherited the regional 
installations of the CBF with varying degrees of success depending upon 
existing infrastructure whilst the CNSS was effectively disestablished (June 
1987) and sectoral health systems acquired increasing importance as the 
already impoverished public hospital network was subjected to withering 
cuts (administered directly through the central budget). As a consequence,the 
normally cautious medical profession made frequent recourse to strikes and 
found itself converging with the union movement to an unprecedented degree. 
(The Colegio Medico, which had been established under Banzer as a strictly 
professional association, now became the site of rising partisanship.) 
This was far more the case with respect to education, where the efforts of 
the highly unpopular minister Ipina (who had transferred his allegiance from 
the MNRI) first to reduce expenditure and then to make the departments 
responsible for administration and finance, were stalled by both union and 
regionalist mobilisation throughout the government's term. Indeed, it was 
perhaps this issue that most effectively concentrated popular antipathy to 
the consequences of Decree 21060 and damaged the regime's image. By 1989 
Ipina had not been able to realise his reforms and yet he had presided over 
four years of stoppages, demonstrations, growing truancy and radically 
reduced school rolls as the combination of absent teachers (notable trans-
ferees to contraband and the penumbra of narcotrafico) and the demands of 
maintaining family subsistence drove thousands of children into full-time 'in-
formal' work.31 
It appears that the government was rather taken aback by this develop-
ment and failed to appreciate that grudging popular acquiescence in the 
imposition of mercantilist logic with respect to productive industry did not 
extend to basic services and welfare, where decentralisation was soon recog-
nised to be cosubstantial with further budgetary decreases and an erosion of 
entitlement. The fact that education enjoyed a particularly high status and 
was still an inextricable feature of daily life gave this opposition a notably 
broad and non-partisan quality. This was channelled through the Comites 
Civicos, which gained unprecedented authority and support in their battles 
with a government that was formally committed to devolution and yet 
strenuously resisted this in practice with regard to payments of the important 
departmental royalties from YPFB production (long an issue of contention 
between the capital and the departments). Facing an unexpectedly strong 
backlash from bodies it had assumed would be compliant, the government 
retreated and had to accept the political consequences of itself administering 
cuts from the centre. As was evident from the municipal elections of 1987, 
the MNR was unprepared for the revivalism of local politics that its 
economic policy generated. 
Coca and Cocaine 
Table Three presents the principal public developments in the political 
economy of coca and cocaine under both the UDP and MNR administra-
tions. From this it can be seen that official efforts to suppress narcotrafico 
were hindered by a number of factors: lack of political will; the strength of 
the coca lobby; disagreements and inefficiency within the military; and con-
fusion over policy. (It should be noted that the table does not include gen-
eral, low-scale activity within the police and judiciary.) Such a picture is 
familiar and, indeed, conforms quite closely to the objections raised by 
Washington, which in 1986 and 1987 witheld some $17.5 million in economic 
aid as a result of failure to meet targets for the eradication of coca.32 (A much 
smaller quantity of military aid was frozen due to problems with suppression 
of cocaine). However, the obstacles to this were truly formidable and encom-
passed much more substantial issues than the debility of the Bolivian state 
and questionable practices by elements of its servants. Important though 
these factors are, they remain symptomatic of a more profound crisis rooted 
in the collapse of the formal economy, popular desperation, and miscon-
ceived North American policy and actions. The debate over these issues is as 
complex as it is passionate, and it cannot be properly rehearsed here. Yet a 
few brief observations may serve to provide a broad context within which to 
approach this major phenomenon. 
First, it should be noted that the illegal production of cocaine stems 
directly from the legal production and consumption of the coca leaf in the 
same country. As in Peru - but not Colombia - the market in coca has been 
an integral element of Aymara and Quechua society for centuries, possessing 
important cultural and religious features that could only be criminalised at 
the cost of a major breakdown in social order. As a consequence, the insis-
tence of the US that narcotrafico be attacked via an offensive on coca was 
from the start riven with problems. Whilst the claim that the 'free sale in coca 
is equivalent to legalising the production of cocaine'33 may be disputed, it is 
nevertheless the case that during the 1980s the connection became very 
strong. Moreover, coca bushes and leaves are more readily detectable than 
is low-bulk, high-value cocaine paste. Yet in operational as well as political 
terms concentration upon coca presents sharp difficulties that La Paz tried 
consistently to avoid and Washington was late and reluctant to recognise. 
Table Three: Coca and Cocaine, 1983-1989 
1983 
April Visit of US Attorney General William French Smith; US-Bolivian 
agreement to reduce coca production to 'level of legitimate 
demand'; CSUTCB national bloqueo cuts off major cities, 
suspended upon government agreement to reconsider accord with 
US. 
June Rafael Otazo meets with Roberto Suarez. 
Aug. Confidential accord with US to reduce Chapare production by 4,000 
hectares by end of 1985 breaks April agreement with growers. 
Government establishes permanent control of transport and sale of 
leaf, promises 'substantial police presence' in Chapare; US to 
channel development aid to region. 
1984 
Jan. August 1983 agreement revealed. 
Feb. Cochabamba deputies attack agreement as unconstitutional. 
March 2,000 Chapare growers demonstrate in Cochabamba. 
May Congress of Chapare growers demands Supreme Court ruling on 
constitutionality of agreement with US. 
Aug. Military zone declared in Chapare; UMOPAR deployed. Coca 
growers' bloqueo of Cochabamba; action ends with official 
agreement not to intervene in coca market; UMOPAR withdrawn 
from area; military enters for six months. 
Otazo-Suarez meeting revealed. 
Sept. Sinahota cocaine market halted; trading shifts to Yapacani region. 
Oct. Government bans shipments of leaf from Chapare and controls 
movements within it ; capture of Suarez ordered. 
Nov. Bloqueo of Cochabamba in demand of free sale of leaf and end to 
military occupation; transport ban and curfew lifted; military 
withdraw. 
1985 
Feb. UMOPAR redeployed in Chapare. 
June Coca price at $800-850 per carga (100 lb.); bloqueos of 
Cochabamba; three campesinos killed by police. 
Nov. Ministry of Interior agreement with representatives of Chimore and 
Chapare growers' federations to eradicate 1,000 hectares by 
mid-December at $350 compensation per hectare. Pact rejected by 
rank and file. 
US Foreign Assistance Act for FY 1986 stipulates that Bolivia 
eradicate 1,000 hectares by end 1985 to receive full aid. 
Dec. Coca price at $200-400 per carga. 
1986 
Jan. UMOPAR camp at Ivirgarzama besieged by campesinos after rape 
of local woman. 
April 'Fuerzas Unidas' joint military operations with US forces. 
May Coca leaf price at $125-150 per carga. 
June Growers halt voluntary eradication due to government failure to 
release economic aid. 
July 'Operation Blast Furnace' with 170 US troops and 6 helicopters. 
Widespread protests; Chapare leaf price falls to $10-20 per carga 
(production costs at $30-40); resignation of Nuflo Chavez from 
MNR in protest at US troop presence. 
Aug. c.100 hectares eradicated under Nov. 1985 agreement; government 
petitions US for $500 million in aid to fight narcotrafico. 
Sept. Assassination of scientist Noel Kempff Mercado by traffickers at 
Huanchaca, Santa Cruz. 
Oct. UMOPAR attacked by populace of Santa Ana de Yacuma, Beni. 
Official closure of Huanchaca case; accusations of 'cover-up' of 
complicity/inefficiency of UMOPAR and DEA. 
Nov. US troops leave; leaf price rises to $40-50 per carga. Departamento 
Nacional de Sustancias Peligrosas (DNSP) purged. Plan Trienal para 
la Lucha contra elNarcotrafico published; calls for eradication of 
50,000 hectares of illicit coca by 1990, including half of Yungas 
production; $320 million 'reactivation funds' promised, 80% to 
come from foreign donors; compensation for eradication set at 
$2,000 per hectare. 
Dec. Negotiations with Club of Paris include aid to fight cocaine trade. 
1987 
Jan. Plan Trienal introduced. 
March COB declares state of emergency in protest at Plan; draft drug law 
published. 
May Growers demand closure of UN agricultural project in Yungas. 
Bloqueos in La Paz and Cochabamba coca zones against Plan; four 
campesinos killed by police, many arrested. 
June Leaf price at $ 100 per carga. 
Official agreement with COB, CSUTCB and Yungas and Chapare 
federations for voluntary eradication; specifically excludes 
eradication by force and use of herbicides; guarantees legal status 
of cultivation; effectively nullifies Plan Trienal. 
Aug. Publication of US-Bolivian agreement to eradicate 1,800 hectares 
by August 1988. 
Sept. $8.7 million in US aid frozen for failure to meet 1986-7 eradication 
target. 
Nov. Campesino leaders denounce government failure to pay credits and 
provide services under June 1987 agreement. 
Dec. c.1,000 hectares eradicated since Sept. at compensation of $2,000 
per hectare (mostly in Carrasco province). 
1988 
Jan. Leaf price at $25-40 per carga. 
National congress of growers (ANAPCOCA) in Cochabamba 
suspends voluntary eradication because of government's 'bad faith'. 
Feb. COB-ANAPCOCA-government agreement ratifies that of June 
1987, provides for growers' participation in Plan Integral de 
Desarrollo y Sustitucion (PIDYS) for coca zones. 
March Chapare growers halt eradication due to alleged UMOPAR abuses 
and lack of aid. 
April Visit of US Attorney General Edwin Meese; COB hunger strike over 
drugs law and budget. 
'Nanovideo' scandal implicates leading members of ADN with 
Suarez. 
May Campesino demonstrations in La Paz and Cochabamba in 
opposition to proposed drug law defining coca as a 'controlled 
substance'; ANAPCOCA breaks negotiations with government. 
June Leaf price at $50-65 per carga. 
Growers' bloqueo of Cochabamba for two days; government offices 
occupied and 10 Bolivian and US officials held hostage. Suarez dubs 
Victor Paz 'the Viceroy of Cocaine'. 
Ten campesinos killed by UMOPAR in VillaTunari, Chapare. 
ANAPCOCA-government talks collapse again. 
July Drugs law approved by congress; establishes maximum of 12,000 
hectares for legal demand, the rest being subject to eradication (at 
annual target of5-8,000 hectares); compensation retained at $2,000. 
Roberto Suarez arrested, in unclear circumstances, in the Beni. 
Aug. ANAPCOCA congress, Cochabamba, declares non-
compliance with law. Leaf price at $120-130 per carga. 
Sept. 120 hectares eradicated since July. 
Oct. Removal of Commander of army's VII Division for selling arms 
to traffickers; UMOPAR withdrawn from Guayamerin after clashes 
with populace. 
Nov. ANAPCOCA congress rej ects eradiction under new law. 
Dec. Total of200 hectares eradicated in last 12 months. 
1989 
Jan. Drugs law comes into operation. 
Jorge Alderete (as Subsecretario de Desarrollo Alternativo, in 
charge of coca/cocaine policy) accuses DE A of domination of 
operations and withholding information. 
Publication of extracts of 'narco-cassettes' in London and Madrid 
ties ADN leader Arce Carpio and others to Suarez; Arce later resigns. 
March Alderete resigns, accusing US of failure to reduce consumption. 
April ANAPCOCA resumes talks with government. 
June Ministry of Interior announces forcible eradication in Chapare from 
July but without presence of military. 
DE A criticises lack of local suport in fighting narcotrafico. Six killed 
in Santa Ana de Yacuma in exchange of fire between UMOPAR 
and navy during operation to detain traffickers. 
ANAPCOCA-government agreement ratifies growers' participation 
in PIDYS. 
Cochabamba campesino leader Evo Morales arrested and tortured 
by police for 'protecting' trafficker 'El Cura'. 
July US Ambassador Gelbard declares 'the Bolivian government does 
not have control over its own territory' with reference to Santa Ana 
incident. 
Drugs law date for forced eradication in Chapare falls due; no action 
taken or forces deployed. 
Government postpones forced eradication sine die and calls for fresh 
talks with growers. 
Sept. PIDYS ratified by new government and given statutory basis in DS 
22270; no move on forced eradication. 
The sheer scale of coca production presents a major challenge to control. 
By the mid-1980s Bolivia accounted for perhaps one third of the world sup-
ply of leaf, and if estimates vary widely - in 1988 the Bolivian government 
put production at 155,000 tons from 60,000 hectares whereas the State 
Department figure was 56,500 tons from 40,300 hectares - they still reflect a 
significant economic activity that may properly be called an industry.34 
Although this tonnage was less than that produced in Peru (and Bolivia's pro-
duction of finished cocaine lags well behind that of Colombia - in terms of 
direct imports into the US it probably stood at 15% against 75%), the indus-
try has a far greater impact within the national economy than does coca/ 
cocaine in the much larger and more diversified economies of the other two 
countries. In terms of revenue, coca production in 1986 was worth approxi-
mately $230 million - or 20% of total receipts from agriculture - whilst 
income from cocaine was, in all likelihood, in excess of $600 million - barely 
less than formal export revenue.35 
Sums of this scale do not simply reflect the high price of an illegal sub-
stance; in fact, the US wholesale price fell between 1980 and 1988 from 
$55,000 to $15,000 per kilo - the ratio between the prices of leaf and derived 
cocaine on US streets being of the order of 500:l.36They also indicate exten-
sive participation in the industry. The estimate of the Bolivian Senate of a 
total of 80,000 cultivators of leaf in the two core growing zones of Yungas (La 
Paz) and Chapare (Cochabamba) is not unreasonable.37 However, to this 
figure must be added at least 25,000pisadores (treaders of leaf), 20,000 other 
people employed in semi-skilled or skilled work, and at least 1,000 at the 
upper end of the trade. If the total of growers - identified as heads of family 
- is multiplied by three to allow for family and other labour, the resulting 
figure for those engaged directly in production of coca is 240,000 and those 
in cocaine at over 45,000. 
Yet these figures still do not represent the full human reach of the industry, 
which not only depends upon protection and allied services (legal, financial 
etc.) but has also generated a dynamic sub-economy of inputs - both at local 
retail level (e.g. kerosene and toilet paper in the city of Cochabamba) and at 
wholesale level (ether; sulphuric acid) - as well as local marketing (e.g. 
through established networks for trading in chicha beer in Cochabamba val 
and probably affects 5% of the population directly. The population of Cha-
pare - the main cocaine-related coca zone - rose from 27,000 in 1967 to 
120,000 in 1985, but even by 1981 over 400,000 people (29,000 vehicles) were 
entering this region.38 This reflects the importance of seasonal migratory 
employment, initially undertaken largely through kinship ties but after the 
mid-1980s increasingly prompted by climatic disruption and economic slump 
in the altiplano (particularly Oruro and Potosi). These factors , together 
with the overwhelming concentration of coca production on small and mod-
est plots, bestow a resolutely 'popular' character on all but the very highest 
echelons of the industry. 
During the 1980s the price of both coca and cocaine was highly elastic, but 
even at its lowest level - in mid-1986 - coca yielded a revenue per hectare 
($2,600) four times greater than that from citrus fruits or avocados, with 
which the US wished to replace it. (At the time of the highest prices - late 
1984; $9,000 per hectare - the ratio was 19: l)3 9 Simple crop substitution was, 
therefore, contrary to all economic sense for the growers. Equally, govern-
ment purchase of leaf - the main UDP strategy - could not match 'real' 
prices, and official compensation for eradication was, at $2,000 per hectare 
from early 1987, well below the growers' demands, which, at $6,000 were 
realistic in terms of 'opportunity cost' if not in terms of the state's capacity to 
pay. The incentives to abandon an activity that provided a modicum of sec-
urity against the process of pauperisation coursing through the rest of the 
economy were minimal. (This applied even more within processing, where 
a pisador could earn in a night more than a schoolteacher did in a month) 
These major obstacles to both criminalising and suppressing production 
were accentuated by the fact that in those areas where the trade was largely 
in the form of semi-processed or (occasionally) finished paste - principally 
Santa Cruz and the Beni - the state was unusually weak and the control of 
wealthy narcotraficantes strengthened by longstanding traditions of con-
traband and landlord patronage. Here conspicuous consumption was com-
plemented by significant expenditure on infrastructure and services, enhanc-
ing popular support for the trade and raising the threat of social conflict no 
less than was the case in the core cultivation areas (eg popular resistance in 
Santa Ana de Yacuma, San Borja and Guayamerin listed in Table Three). 
More broadly, the close association of the military regimes of 1980-82 with 
narcotrafico had not, principally for the reasons cited above, generated 
widespread repudiation of the industry as a whole. On the contrary, as the 
economic crisis deepened under the civilian administrations it acquired a 
measure of legitimacy, and the political scope for attacking it diminished sig-
nificantly except in two respects. First, the pressure from Washington was 
considerable and required some form of response. (The real impact of moral 
pressure was negligible until mid-1989, when the scale of killing by the Col-
ombian narcos engendered genuine revulsion and sympathy for the plight of 
that country ; as a result North American sermons were treated with rather 
less disdain). Secondly, outside of the Oriente the leading traffickers were 
popularly viewed as corrupt arrivistes as well as major beneficiaries of the 
dictatorship; outside of their own regions they could not bank on much sym-
pathy, still less stage a political campaign under their own colours. Yet, if sup-
pression in general threatened to close off a critical economic safety-valve, 
compliance with US demands raised authentic problems with regard to 
sovereignty and claims on national pride. Equally, the failure to conduct all 
but the most token purge of the military and civil service after 1982 meant 
that many who were subsequently charged with directing suppression were 
simultaneously benefitting directly or, more often, indirectly from the trade. 
Thus, in addition to the overwheming economic and logistical problems -
never resolved despite appreciable US assistance - the governments were 
faced with an acute ideological challenge. 
One notable feature of this was the convergence of interested parties on 
the right with the left in objecting to suppression on anti-imperialist grounds, 
which, it might be noted, were even employed by the Garcia Mesa regime 
once it had been ostracised by the Reagan White House. The arguments for 
this opposition were simple. Reduction of the cocales directly prejudiced the 
means of subsistence of hundreds of thousands of poor campesinos, what-
ever its final objective with respect to cocaine. These small farmers produced 
a legal crop for which there was no substitute that yielded remotely compar-
able earnings. Destruction of the cocaine factories invariably involved the 
punishment of lowly workers, not major dealers, very few of whom were 
ever caught and fewer still brought to trial.These raids were staged selec-
tively - often to settle scores - , simply drove production centres deeper into 
the backlands, and had no lasting impact on prices or production; even the 
catharsis experienced by the gringos was ephemeral. Futhermore, 'interdic-
tion operations' were frequently attended by violence on the part of the 
police and armed forces, and they depended increasingly upon US interven-
tion. Perhaps most important of all, the entire strategy of attacking produc-
tion and supply, rather than demand and consumption, stemmed from a 
North American determination to transfer the blame and cost from its own 
rich citizens and state to their impoverished counterparts in Bolivia. The 
opprobium attached to this was further sharpened by the fact that the US 
was viewed as directly responsible for generating the broader economic crisis 
that prompted the upsurge of popular involvement in narcotrafico, and by its 
strenuous resistance to provision of adequate recompense for the sacrifices 
incurred on its behalf for adhering to free market (outlaw) forces. Such a pos-
ition was not only hypocritical; its immorality was decidedly imperialist. 
Such an outlook is not, of course, unique to Bolivia; aspects of it are 
equally evident in both Peru and Colombia, where it had an even sharper 
impact on national political life. However, the Bolivian experience was dis-
tinctive in two important and related respects: the generally low level of 
social violence associated with narcotrafico itself (closer to Peru than Colom-
bia) and the absence of any guerrilla movement or substantial paramilitary 
forces (different from both other countries). While not exactly peaceable, 
production was partly legal and exacted a relatively slight social cost, at least 
until the late 1980s, when growing use of the debased and dangerous cocaine 
derivative bazuko by youths, particularly in Cochabamba, began to sharpen 
anxieties.41 Even then, the violence surrounding the trade was seen as stem-
ming from suppression, the state and the US - not local traficantes, and still 
less the growers, whose principal means of resistance were passive (the 
bloqueo above all else), mass-based and in conformity with the traditions of 
the popular movement. Furthermore, since involvement in the upper 
reaches of the trade was less based on clearly defined clans outside the polit-
ical system than linked to membership of all sections of its civilian and milit-
ary elite, no amount of official blandishments could overcome popular cyni-
cism. 
The passage of events outlined in Table Three shows that despite its 
recourse to national and US troops and the introduction of major new legis-
lation, the MNR fared little better than had the UDP. Its more decisive 
actions were met with greater resistance, obliging resort to negotiations in 
which the state made strictly limited progress towards eradication. The con-
duct of UMOPAR remained unreliable, the armed forces persisted in their 
reluctance to be involved in unpopular operations, dependence upon US 
support opened up conflict within the party (Alderete; Nuflo Chavez) as 
well as outside it, and the threat of scandal was never far off. Judging solely 
(and thus very conservatively) on the basis of 'errors and omissions' in the 
national accounts, the formally registered infusion of narcodo-
lares was at least $64 million in 1986 (much higher thereafter). It is unlikely, 
however, that the MNR actively contrived this situation, which might be best 
viewed as an embarrassing windfall resulting from forces that otherwise 
transpired to be more intractable than those it faced in stabilising the formal 
economy.42 
Popular disdain for the North American position did not lack some jus-
tified foundation. The US was exceptionally reluctant to deal with its 
unwanted monopsony (the European market remained slight) other than in 
time-honoured fashion. It held to the policy of crop substitution long after it 
had been shown to be fruitless; the public pronouncements of its local rep-
resentatives exhibited an arrogance - sometimes intended, sometimes 
depressingly ingenue - that infuriated senior Bolivian officials; and it could 
not break from a coercive and conditional approach to development aid for 
the coca zones where, according to Ambassador Corr (later 'promoted' to El 
Salvador), electrification would only 'allow narcos to work at night'.43 (The 
fact that they already did casts an even more forlorn light on this remark). 
The price to be paid for an alternative approach was deemed too high, even 
after cocaine became a major issue in domestic politics. Like the MNR's 
drug law, the Bennett report was conspicuous by its failure to introduce real 
change. 
Aware of this, the MNR, which had already invested the great bulk of its 
ideological capital in stabilisation, adopted a distinctly opportunist course. 
Haunted (if not taunted) by its supposed policy of agropoder, if failed to 
match rhetoric with practice when it came to curbing the most 
agropoderosos. Realistically depending upon a reputation for managerial 
efficiency rather than outstanding moral probity, it shuffled past the option 
of launching a popular crusade. Exasperated by the exigencies of ministering 
to the protests of the victims of its economic policies, it forebore from tar-
nishing the growers as another group of 'anarchosyndicalists'. Last, but by 
no means least, it recognised that voluble inaction was the key to preserving 
the boon provided to stabilisation policy by cocaine revenue. This, quite 
naturally, was a hostage to fortune, but Victor Paz had good cause to be 
unconcerned about it, and despite all the bravura complaint after the 1989 
poll, many a movimientista had reluctantly accepted that the price of the fear-
lessness of stabilisation was a resounding voto de castigo, leaving others to 
deal with the consequences. In the event, this view was shown to be correct, 
but it is a reflection of the extraordinary vagaries of politics over the prior 
four years that it very nearly transpired to be false. 
Politics 
After the tumult of the UDP, formal political life under the MNR became 
'little' in the sense that it was primarily concerned with tactical manoeuvres 
and administrative issues. There were few 'grand events' to interrupt the 
institutional calendar, and those that did occur - the visits of the West Ger-
man President, the King of Spain, and the Pope - had a strictly marginal 
impact on policy. Victor Paz's sombre comportment was a significant ele-
ment in this picture, not least by containing the tensions within the MNR 
caused by the severity of stabilisation. 
These rotated predictably about the person of Sanchez de Lozada, who 
some claimed - incorrectly - had never actually sworn loyalty to the party 
and others saw - justifiably - as little less than a heretic in his attitude to 
movimientista traditions. His leading critic was Guillermo Bedregal, foreign 
minister and recent returner to the ranks after splitting with Paz over support 
for the coup of Colonel Natusch (whose short-lived cabinet Bedregal had 
effectively led). Since Bedregal had headed the initial effort in the early 
1960s to restructure Comibol in the face of bitter union resistance it was 
somewhat ironic that he should baulk at the social cost of this two decades 
later; a more plausible cause for his ill-concealed rancour lay with ambitions 
to succeed Paz as jefe or at least to become presidential candidate in 1989. 
Although Bedregal failed on both counts, this was not before he had suc-
ceeded in summoning appreciable support from the party's 'old guard' 
headed by the eternally unpredictable Nuflo Chavez, who could still com-
mand some authority beyond his stronghold of Santa Cruz. The 
traditionalists disliked 'Goni's' refusal to adhere to rhetorical customs, his 
independent outlook and mercurial disposition, and, perhaps most of all, his 
bourgeois background - none of which was typical of the party leadership 
(except Victor Paz himself). The fact that his policies also threatened to 
damn the MNR to electoral defeat provided the unstated impetus to this 
campaign, which emerged in the first months of the government and then 
receded until the pre-electoral period once it was clear that their success had 
ensured that Paz would support Sanchez de Lozada's policies and endure his 
candour in presenting them. 
The insistence upon making a virtue out of a necessity in defending stabili-
sation was distinctly novel and won the minister a surprising degree of 
respect that only began to erode when his abject inability to resist a good 
joke or telling insult came to be seen in the context of the presidency from 
late 1988. At that stage it became plain how complementary the characters 
of Paz and his de facto chief minister had been; the prospect of the trouble-
shooter operating on his own was far from reassuring. (In this sense the party 
would possibly have been better advised to by-pass both Sanchez de Lozada 
and Bedregal, who had a widespread and far from undeserved reputation for 
mendacity, and present a more 'statesmanlike' candidate, such as Vice-Pres-
ident Julio Garret Ay lion, to preside over the squabbling factions.) 
The MNR was historically a party of 'sectors' and internecine intrigue, 
originally based upon authentic ideological divisions and feudal competition 
(often localist as well as over the spoils of office and patronage). Sub-
sequently this tendency was sharpened by the high incidence of expulsions, 
repudiations and prodigal homecomings in exile, opposition or at the service 
of military governments. By 1985 there were no significant survivors from 
the left of the party - the initial appointment of the old FSTMB activist Sin-
foroso Cabrera as minister of mines reflected nothing more than a personal 
conversion. Nevertheless, both longstanding animosities and the infusion of 
'newcomers' to the cabinet - notably Defence Minister Fernando Valle, pre-
viously of the ADN and a senior adviser to Garcia Mesa - provided ample 
potential for schism. That this did not occur may be attributed to a number 
of factors. First, Paz, as founder and historic leader of the MNR was person-
ally intachable and possessed binding powers of arbitration. Secondly, there 
was minimal disagreement over the basic necessity of stabilisation, and since 
this - rather than 'reactivation" - preoccupied the government for most of its 
term, the authors of Decree 21060 held the initiative. Thirdly, the MNR was 
only able to govern with the support of the ADN, and the extremely sharp 
challenge made by Banzer immediately following the 1985 poll on the basis 
of his superior vote was not forgotten once he had been denied the presi-
dency by congress (with the support of the left) and then became a party to 
the Facto por la Democracia in October. Unity within the MNR was essential 
both to the preservation of the pact - and thus the maintenance of office -
and to any successful emergence from its demise (which was more widely 
anticipated within the MNR than was publicly recognised). The support of 
both Washington and the armed forces, where there were many more or less 
closet militants, together with the absence of a concerted challenge from the 
left, provided further, unprecedented incentives to keep the party cohesive 
and disciplined. 
The Pact of October 1985 was undoubtedly the linchpin of the administra-
tion although it should be noted that it did not formally provide for a coali-
tion, merely collaboration at legislative level, thereby largely overcoming 
the conservative sectarianism so evident in the election campaign. It is sig-
nificant that the agreement, which lasted until February 1989, was not sealed 
until after the government had survived the COB's general strike of Sep-
tember and the consequent declaration of a state of siege. Although the 
ADN fully supported Decreee 21060 - and indeed declared that it had been 
all but stolen from them and their adviser Juan Cariaga - it studiously 
awaited the outcome of the inevitable clash with the unions before pledging 
its strategic support. Moreover, it did not gain a foothold in the cabinet until 
S&nchez de Lozada had outfaced Bedregal over the necessity of keeping 
firmly to the government's initial economic policies. Thereafter differences 
were of a strictly secondary order within an alliance that permitted appreci-
able latitude in terms of local competition and appeared to rest on the under-
standing that, in a variant of the Colombian and Venezuelan 'models' after 
1958, Banzer would be allowed to reap the benefits of the 1989 poll. (Here 
the MNR acted no less opportunistically in ending the Pact than had the 
ADN in entering it). There was plenty of confident talk of the accord taking 
Bolivia into the 21st Century. 
As the 'junior partner' the ADN celebrated its 'responsibility' and 'self-
lessness' rather more quickly than the resulting Pact, especially in the initial 
stages of the administration when it appeared that the MNR would gain the 
lion's share of benefit from directing the economic policies the agreement 
was primarily designed to support. Adenista dissidence was relatively slight 
in extent, but it did lead to the loss of Banzer's running-mate Eudoro 
Galindo, who left with a section of younger, more 'ideological' cadre and 
eventually entered the ranks of movimientismo. As a result, the party 
became a more firmly personalist organisation. Nonetheless, the high pro-
file of ex-mayor of La Paz Ronald Maclean provided a forceful and modern 
entrepreneurial image that contrasted markedly with that of his successor 
Raul Salm6n, an independent but traditional machine-politician who had 
previously served under sundry regimes with no apparent prejudice to his 
reputation - underlining, perhaps, the dangers of ascribing to 'modernity' 
the qualities of unambiguous appeal. Security through familiarity was no less 
a requirement in troubled times. 
It was the MIR, which most lacked authority gleaned from experience in 
office, and most assiduously promoted its 'newness', that attempted to court 
Salm6n. Their short-lived liaison following the 1987 municipal elections was 
perhaps the most prominent - certainly the most erratic and contentious -
feature of the party's strategy of expanding its activity through the develop-
ment of a loose alliance of sympathisers under the name of Nueva Mayoria, 
which soon became a permanent suffix to the party's acronym.44 This initia-
tive yielded significant reward in the elections of 1987 and 1989 in that it 
offered some shelter for politicians and middle class activists who wished to 
remain in mainstream politics and retain their progressive bona fides. They 
could no longer countenance support for the left, and neither could they suc-
cumb to the lure of movimientismo, which, for all its new-found dynamism, 
was tacking the most conservative course in its 40-year history. The loss of its 
left wing deprived the MIR of both organisational strength and ideological 
coherence. Jaime Paz had already begun to move further rightwards, but 
within congress the MIR stood as the only significant party of opposition 
after the Pact of October 1985; the logic of this position was that it attacked 
the MNR-ADN alliance from the left. Thus, under circumstances very diffe-
rent to those prevailing under the UDP, the MIR was confronted with a 
number of taxing challenges whereby it had, on the one hand, to divorce 
itself from a discredited left and yet maintain its progressive pretensions, 
and, on the other, take a critical position on the NEP that did not evoke a 
return to the status quo ante and enable the government to dismiss it as the 
shame-faced rump of the UDP. 
The MIR's relative success in manoeuvring through these uncharted wat-
ers owed much to the MNR's moderation in assailing it. Amongst the reasons 
for this were the need to be assured of cooperation in both houses of con-
gress, particularly the senate, where the balance of forces was more delicate; 
the (correct) perception that there was little to be lost by celebrating the con-
stitutional opposition of a 'moderate and civilised' left; and, to some degree, 
the affinity felt by Sanchez de Lozada for the MIR leadership, whom he 
excoriated with characteristic panache but whom he also treated seriously. 
(This was a prescient attitude in view of the 1989 election results and could 
have laid the basis for the much vaunted 'second phase' of stabilisation in 
'reactivation' under an MNR-MIR alliance were it not for 'Goni's' tardy shift 
from campaign invective, at which he excelled, to overture, for which his 
skills were indifferent). The MIR's own trajectory may plausibly be viewed 
as a combination of Jaime Paz's single-minded presidential vocation (no 
doubt sharpened by his experience as vice president yet extraordinary in that 
he so ardently coveted the office without any corresponding explanation as 
to why); the 'hegemonic' status of stabilisation; and a broader transition 
within international social democracy away from keynesianism - and its 
modern corollary in equitable association with organised labour - towards 
managerialism, wherein neither pragmatism nor the discourse of moderate 
welfarism were greatly altered. In this latter respect, the increasingly desper-
ate gyrations of Alan Garcia's APRA governemnt across the border in Peru 
certainly exercised a sobering influence.45 
The combination of the Pact, the MIR's dedication to compliant opposi-
tion, and the weakness of the parliamentary left accounts for the relatively 
subdued conduct of affairs within cabinet and congress. At government level 
more attention was paid to disorderly conduct - the unprovoked assault on 
a traffic policeman by the industry minister (December 1986) and Defence 
Minister Valle's drunken speech to congress (April 1987, when the high com-
mand protested that he had revealed 'matters of national security') - than to 
the residual animus displayed by Bedregal and Sanchez de Lozada. Within 
congress matters such as the MIR's baiter of support for tax reform in return 
for the new electoral law (April 1986) raised minimal public interest - the sta-
tute is inordinately complex, possibly purposefully so - compared with the 
legislators' concern to award themselves munificent pay rises (October 1986; 
July 1988). This provoked sufficient ire within the public that an acutely 
embarrassed government was obliged to take rapid action in order to avoid 
a critical loss in that institutional legitimacy which constituted a major prop 
for its own programme. 
This also came under challenge in a more novel fashion from the referen-
dum - Consulta Popular - organised by the COB in July 1986 on the tax 
reform, payment of the external debt, and the deployment of US troops. The 
threat posed by this poll lay less in its result - an overwhelming repudiation 
of government policies by a surprisingly large 'electorate' (1,428,000, of 
whom 898,000 voted against the policies) - than in its restitution of the 
impulses of 'popular democracy'. The level of participation indicates at the 
very least that these were not dormant since the government waged a strong 
campaign against the referendum and came close to banning it altogether. 
Held less than a year after the introduction of Decree 21060, the Consulta 
Popular may simply be viewed as a predictable expression of discontent in 
much the same light as the result of the 1987 municipal elections. However, 
it also indicated a significant shift on the part of the COB, which had per-
force to move beyond reliance on strikes and the diminishing membership of 
its constituent unions. In this sense the referendum marked the first step in 
a process whereby the COB acquired a more reactive role in relation to popu-
lar discontent, coordinating rather than leading protest. Increased resort to 
hunger strikes similarly indicated a defensive position in which appeal to 
popular sentiment replaced industrial strength as a means of bargaining. 
This approach was most closely determined by the position of the 
relocalizados from Comibol, whose wretched fate was the subject of inces-
sant disputes throughout the government and reached its apogee in the mock 
'crucifixion' of redundant miners in La Paz in April 1989. Following the visit 
of the Pope, and after three years experience of penniless miners and their 
families camped in El Alto, the populace of the capital responded to such 
acts of desperation with a sympathy that stood in sharp contrast to its 
hostile reaction to the March 1985 occupation. There was an increase 
in talk of the country's historic debt to the miners, public recognition of their 
sacrifice, and some qualification of earlier emphatic epitaphs for the industry. 
Of course, such matters neither cost the government very much nor 
offered the miners more than ephemeral consolation in what was an indis-
putable defeat. Only at the Huanuni mine was the FSTMB able to retain any 
substantive resistance (tellingly, on health and safety grounds), and after the 
government's use of troops in September 1986 to halt the union's 'March for 
Peace and Life' from Oruro to La Paz - which accumulated great popular 
support and threatened a major political crisis - the FSTMB was thrown into 
confusion over how to react. Conflict over the form and degree of response 
produced three major shifts in its leadership in 1986 and ended in an uneasy 
compromise whereby the balance between the radicals of the DRU/Eje de 
Convergencia and the PCB was publicly sustained by Victor Lopez -
associated with Lechin but also autonomous from him - and practically 
determined by Filemon Escobar - erstwhile porista and now the most ardent 
advocate of autogestionismo. This pattern was broadly reproduced within 
the COB itself at the VII Congress of July 1987, when Lechin's fiat was 
finally eliminated, first Lopez and then Simon Reyes presiding over a tense 
truce between two weakened blocks, neither of which possessed the capacity 
to realise their antagonistic strategems outside the debating hall.46 
Such a scenario evoked the experience of the dictatorial era and reflected 
a loss of authority and direction more profound than that witnessed after the 
1957 stabilisation, when the mines were not greatly affected by redundan-
cies. It raised the pertinent question of whether the traditional leadership of 
the COB by the FSTMB could be maintained. However, the reiterated 
claims to this role by the CSUTCB were undermined by its own deep divi-
sions, which the COB itself had to arbitrate and which emphasised the con-
tinued preponderance of caudillismo and dubious practices of patronage 
over ideology in a sector that was poorly suited to operate according to the 
norms of industrial syndicalism. Yet if this presented a major organisational 
challenge to the COB, it did not, as has been seen, marginalise the cam-
pesinado from wider political life, even if the succession of bloqueos and the 
emergent influence of the federations of the coca zones were - like the pro-
tests over health, education and local administration - only loosely 
associated with the orthodox political opposition. 
In one sense, the fact that the left had strictly limited influence over these 
movements complicated life for the government, which found little relief in 
stock anti-communist and anti-syndicalist invective and had to contend with 
a variety of organisations that lacked firm control over their supporters. The 
price of victory in the realm of formal politics was an uncontainable fluidity 
in regional and sectoral disputes, none of which posed a threat to the govern-
ment's national authority but which, in sum, severely constrained its writ. 
Whilst this corresponded in part to a 'natural' retreat by the effectively disen-
franchised constituency of the left that redeployed its political energies in a 
more quotidien and tactical fashion, it also raised the spectre of a dangerous 
anomie conducive to the emergence of forces similar to Sendero Luminoso. 
Fears of this grew from mid-1988 as it became evident that some elements 
associated with katarismo were abandoning faith in either constitutionalist 
or quasi-syndicalist/collectivist methods of struggle and seeking more direct 
and violent means. At the same time, occasional scares about senderista 
intromissions gained some substance when, in December 1988, the Peruvian 
naval attache was assassinated in the middle of La Paz. The subsequent kil-
ling of three Mormon missionaries by the hiterto unknown Fuerzas Armadas 
de Liberacion Nacional-Zdrate Willka (FAL-ZW) sharpened apprehension 
in this quarter although the little available evidence - far exceeded by 
rumour - suggested both that the group was tiny and isolated and that the 
government was determined at all cost to avoiding provoking Sendero, 
which probably did make use of Bolivian territory around Lakeliticaca but 
continued to experience greater problems with the Aymara communities of 
the border region than it had with the Quechua majority around Cusco. 
Although the progression from participation in legal politics to those of sub-
version is rarely linear, and the two are seldom as mutually exclusive as 
theorists and proponents of counter-insurgency claim, this space had evi-
dently been crossed by very few. Perhaps because of a flexibility endowed by 
the very weakness of the state, the system neither generated such despair 
nor unlocked enough residual millenarian convictions to promote a move-
ment comparable to that in Peru. 
As in Peru, the continued existence and very modest recovery of the 
orthodox left played little part in this. The reconstruction of electoral unity 
around the MBL and PCB as Alianza Patri6tica (1987 municipal elections) 
and then Izquierda Unida (1989 poll) and the spirited but strictly limited 
activity of the PS-1 and MRTKL had minimal impact on the national balance 
of forces. But, in contrast to the Peruvian case, the retention of some sys-
tematic equilibrium may be attributed to the rise of a new form of populism 
that succeeded far better than the left in voicing the preoccupations of the 
poor. This movement may be characterised as reactionary in that its principal 
protagonist - Carlos Palenque - had good right wing credentials (part 
movimientista, part barrientista), a considerable fortune, and manifest talent 
for constructing alliances with a status quo that he simultaneously berated 
for its callow indifference to the commonwealth. Moreover, whilst Palen-
que's exploitation of radio and television was overwhelmingly dedicated to 
the expression of individual complaints and tales of misfortune (the hourly 
'Tribuna Libre del Pueblo'), its concentration on CONDEPA's distribution 
of free spectacles, food and other hand-outs was understandably more insis-
tent than was the promulgation of indecipherable 'autochthonous' economic 
policies by which the fledgling party proposed to resolve the wider crisis that 
made this old-style clientelism so necessary and popular. 
On the other hand, the synthesis of an unmediated voxpopuli, attacks on 
a 'dictatorial' and 'uncaring' government, effusions of sympathy for the min-
ers and coca growers, and celebration of popular culture - from Cantinflas 
to the el Gran Poder - unnerved the established parties and rapidly dislo-
cated customary political allegiances in the capital and surrounding pro-
vinces. If'Compadre ' Palenque himself was too 'white' and accomplished a 
media personality - he had previously played in a popular folk group - to 
pass himself off as an authentic member of the newly urbanised Aymara 
underclass, he was exceptionally adept at projecting its travails. Moreover, 
his copresenter on television,'Comadre' Remedios Loza, operated as a per-
fect foil in that as an articulate, bilingual and attractive chola, she generated 
considerable appeal amongst women - very poorly represented in other par-
ties - across the class and ethnic divide whilst inviting but failing to provoke 
a macho backlash. Both Palenque and the instinctively more radical Loza 
concentrated their attention on the domestic sphere, which was either 
ignored or dismissed with pious platitudes by the orthodox politicians. They 
thereby largely circumvented the greatest potential obstacle to CONDEPA 
in the widening economic chasm between impoverished recent migrants and 
the enriched market traders and rentiers of similar social and ethnic 
background whose operations appeared petty but who had, for some, 
become a veritable bourgeoisie. 
It is telling that the emergence and rapid rise to prominence of CON-
DEPA in La Paz followed the 1987 municipal elections, which in the capital 
witnessed a quite extraordinary decomposition on both protocol and mores 
amongst the established forces. The real casualty of this was Salmon, who 
was supported for his first election for the post of mayor by the MIR and a 
loose grouping known as the 'Friends of Don Raul' against the candidacy of 
Ronald Maclean, backed by the ADN and MNR. The poll resulted in the 
election of six concejales (aldermen) for each bloc, opening up a tortuous 
process of negotiation that soon collapsed into an opera bouffe when one of 
Salmon's supporters changed sides upon the alleged - and never fully denied 
- payment of $100,000 by the government parties. However, just as the 
partners of the Pact were set to ratify and celebrate their 7-5 victory on tele-
vision, the machiavelian qualities of Don Raul surpassed even their literary 
depiction by Mario Vargas Llosa in the offer by his camp to Walter Mur, a 
prominent movimientista, to back him as mayor. This utterly unexpected 
proposal so enticed Mur that he cast aside party loyalty and voted against 
Maclean, thus returning the contest to a stalemate from which neither side 
emerged with a modicum of credit although one was a great deal worse off 
financially and the other had inherited the services of a mathematical dunce. 
This unedifying spectacle continued for a full three months after which the 
office was given to each of the orignal candidates for half the term, beginning 
a race for popularity through expenditure on grandiose projects, particularly 
by Salmon, whose remodelling of Laikacota hill for a new 'central park' was 
but a transient triumph of civic imagination over geological realities. Sub-
sequently Salmon threw in his depleted lot with the MNR as the best means 
by which to exact revenge on the bourgeois upstart Maclean, but he was 
soundly defeated in the 1989 senatorial race. The MIR, for its part, perhaps 
reconciled to the loss of the city under the twin pressures of Palenque's media 
appeal and Maclean's cash, set its sights on the rural vote through alliance -
under the auspices of the Nueva Mayoria - with the dissident movimientismo 
of Carlos Serrate Reich, whose close supporter Zenon Barrientos Mamani 
could still command a sizeable proportion of the votes he had delivered to 
the MNR from the northern altiplano in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
Such manoeuvres produced results, but it is clear that these were obtained 
at a rising cost in terms of legitimacy, the myriad paths for tactical votos de 
castigo amongst contestants of comparable ideological hue threatening to 
lead all into a cul-de-sac. Disenchantment was not lessened by the much-
publicised failure to bring the Garcia Mesa trial to a conclusion, even in the 
absence of the defendant, who absconded from military supervision with an 
ease that only fortified popular disdain for claims to resolute impartiality on 
the part of the authorities. This sentiment was further enhanced by the fact 
that when Sudrez and Palenque attacked Victor Paz they were either 
apprehended or punished with unusual celerity and efficiency. However 
questionable their past or motives, they had at least stood up to the system 
and therefore deserved sympathy. This distinguishes them from another 
aggressive arriviste, Max Fernandez, who had bought La Paz's highly profit-
able brewery with funds of uncertain origin and now tried to contest the 1989 
poll by distributing largesse, particularly in the Oriente. However, Fernan-
dez soon discovered that overnight purchase of a political party is a prob-
lematic undertaking when his bargain-basement apparatchiks - mostly from 
the moribund FSB - simply took the money and ran. His later response to 
the 'triple empate' in calling for a military coup endeared him to very few, but 
the fact that he could make such a bold entrance into the political arena 
suggested that Palenque was not a singular phenomenon and that the rules 
of politics were undergoing a disturbing transformation. 
The results and immediate consequences of the 1989 poll, however, indi-
cated that these new political figures posed a more limited challenge to the 
status quo. CONDEPA won the vote in the capital by a very clear margin 
(121,024 against second-placed ADN with 82,524), but it lost to the MIR in 
the departmental provinces and trailed very poorly elsewhere in the coun-
try, amassing just 11% of the total vote. This score was roughly equal to the 
combined vote of the left (IU - 7.2%; PS-1 - 2.5%; MRTKL - 1.5%). 
Equally, it should be recalled that the MIR polled only 19.6% of the vote -
enough to give Jaime Paz the presidency, albeit under tight ADN control in 
cabinet. In these circumstances it can be appreciated that any percentage of 
the vote in double figures had to be treated seriously, and CONDEPA had 
concentrated its support most effectively for the purposes of winning con-
gressional seats and thus negotiating terms. Its opposition to the MNR was 
immovable and based almost exclusively on the closure of Palenque's televi-
sion station in 1988. However, the'compadre ' was quick to join in talks with 
Jaime Paz and Banzer, and although no formal agreement was signed, CON-
DEPA's voting record in the new parliament proved consistently supportive 
of the governing alliance. The cost to the ADN and MIR would be loss of the 
city council and the departmental development corporation, taken over to 
much fanfare shortly after Jaime Paz's inauguration with immediate prom-
ises - conditional upon treasury support - to start construction of a road from 
La Paz to Pando. CONDEPA thus set down a marker for its ambitions and 
the direction of blame should they not be fulfilled. Nonetheless, the limits of 
cooptation had not been stretched very far to incorporate the party. 
A similarly sober interpretation of the fragility of the political system may 
be derived from the process of negotiation between the country's three lead-
ing forces. Here the MNR's decision early in 1989 to abandon the Pact of 
October 1985 and make an independent 'dash for power' constituted a calcu-
lated risk that came close to success in simple electoral terms. However, it 
also helped to sharpen the incidence of malpractice before, during and after 
the poll, pushing the party extremely close to repudiating an election held 
under its government but effectively controlled by the ADN and MIR, which 
dominated the electoral courts and now felt little need to curb manipulation 
by their supporters. Yet despite extensive partisan intervention in the 
results, these stood and a new government was elected according to the con-
situtional timetable. The fact that it began as a coalition suggested that the 
division of the dominant political bloc into three was not as debilitating or 
dangerous as many feared. Indeed, some held that the 'triple empate' pro-
vided the best electoral foundation for 'concertacion'. Moreover, following 
Jaime Paz's inauguration, all parties accepted the need for electoral reform, 
and Sanchez de Lozada adopted the role of leader of a responsible opposi-
tion without undue difficulty. 
Amongst the chief features identified as underpinning this outcome were 
the flexibility and skill of Banzer and the erosion of movimientismo. The 
former may be accepted only with the caveat that Banzer was no longer in 
any position to pose an authoritarian alternative and had, alone of the three 
leading candidates, already served as president; his ambitions for office were 
not as sharp and had been further reduced by physical frailty and the death 
of his sons. Under the circumstances his actions were unremarkable, provid-
ing the ADN with a dominant voice in policy-making whilst Jaime Paz 
attended football matches and signed agrarian reform titles. Equally, notice 
of the death of the MNR was somewhat exaggerated, even if the generation 
and many of the traditions of 1952 were in advanced decline. Between 1985 
and 1989 the party's exploitation of the revolutionary legacy was slight and 
indirect, revolving principally around the figure of Victor Paz. It will not, of 
course, be entirely jettisoned since it lends some gravitas and resolution to 
the image of the MNR. Yet a further diminution of 'historical' movimien-
tismo would little affect the substance of the party's conduct. 
Certainties with respect to the weakness of the left were no less well 
founded in mid-1989 than in mid-1985, at least in terms of established party 
organisations. However, a degree of caution is in order here in terms of the 
wider potential for a renewal of a radical movement. In the first place, the 
electorate will by 1994 have experienced government by all components of 
what might be termed the 'triple conservative alliance'. From a purely elec-
toral viewpoint this may simply enhance the degree of tactical voting on the 
basis of a more informed logic of the 'mal menor\ (It should be noted that 
the MNR-MIR option remains untested). On the other hand, the prospect 
of 'more of the same' is likely to be upheld by all these parties and, after a 
prolonged period of recession in the poorest country in mainland America, 
this may well exasperate the evidently large number of uncommitted voters 
as well as supporters of CONDEPA. In order to evade this scenario the right 
will have to achieve not only the economic growth that has persistently 
eluded it but also a qualitative expansion of welfare and an authentic resolu-
tion to the dilemmas posed by narcotrafico. 
The prospects on all three fronts are less than bright, as is that of a 
thorough reform of state institutions, where the customs of malpractice and 
partisanship persist to growing popular discontent. If these issues have long 
been the left's stock-in-trade and offer fertile ground for recovery, a less 
familiar challenge lies in adjusting to the decline of the COB and the 
emergence of forces such as CONDEPA. Failure to address these critical 
developments could well result in more than the left being reduced from the 
status of a minority to that of an entirely peripheral entity; it might also 
encourage the incidence of social violence, drawing Bolivia much closer to 
the Peruvian experience. The disiderata in this regard are peculiarly taxing 
since they include a simultaneous move away from surpassed traditions and 
defence of those that take a similar form but remain vital - as demonstrated 
by Palenque for La Paz - in affirming ethnic and social identity. As yet the 
full gamut of distinctions is unclear, even within the discourse of 'western' 
ideologies and practice. Yet failure to address both the American' and 'Euro-
pean' features of this dilemma is likely to produce a far nastier future than 
that of Bolivia quietly queuing up to take its modest place in 'the end of his-
tory'. 
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APPENDIX I 
CHRONOLOGY 
1982 Oct. 10 Herman Siles sworn in as President of UDP government 
(MNRI; MIR; PCB) before restored Congress elected in 
1980. 
Nov. 6 First economic 'paquete', including 'de-dollarisation', 
presented without IMF approval to strong opposition 
from right and left. 
Dec. Appearance of divisions in MNRI and threat of UDP split. 
1983 Jan. Diplomatic relations with Havana restored. 
7 MIR leaves government, but not UDP; MNRI split 
deepens. 
14 Conflict in Santa Cruz university over officials appointed 
by military regime. 
Feb. 4 Expulsion of Klaus Barbie to France. 
CEPB alleges UDP intent to 'liquidate private sector'. 
26 UDP defeated in Congress over censure of Minister of 
Asuntos Campesinos, Zenon Barrientos Mamani. 
Mar. Severe drought in Altiplano; floods in Santa Cruz. 
11 COB and Minister of Interior accuse CEPB and rightist 
parties of preparing 'golpe constitucionaV. 
IMF rejects request of $200 m loan. 
12 Siles ratifies Jaime Paz Zamora as Vice President. 
Leading pro-dictatorship officers removed. 
Apr. Campesinos stage 5-day bloqueo over official inaction over 
disasters; government concedes demands. 
4 Comibol technicians' strike attacked by FSTMB. 
9 Siles in speech on anniversary of 1952 Revolution expresses 
willingness to accept cogestion and cogobierno with COB. 
Visit of US Secretary of Justice William French Smith; 
agreement to reduce coca production. 
19 FSTMB occupies Comibol La Paz offices and imposes 
cogestion; welcomed byVice President Jaime Paz. 
May 6 CEPB conference attacks government as 'quasi-
communist'. Government lays charges against ex-President 
Garcia Mesa and Col. Arce Gomez; homes of senior 
pro-UDP army officers attacked. 
Judge exonerates Roberto Suarez from charges of 
narcotrafico. 
17 MNRI 'palaciego' faction wins 15-day cabinet struggle. 
21 Arce Gomez arrested in Buenos Aires; US demands his 
extradition. 
Jun. 1 Repatriation of remains of Gen. Juan Jose Torres. 
11 Release of ex-Col. 'Buby' Salmon, accused of narcotrafico 
and golpismo; return to country of extreme rightist ex-Col. 
Faustino RicoToro. Coup rumours increase. 
16 Government unilaterally declares cogestion paritaria in 
Comibol. 
Jul. 7 Colegio Medico strike declared illegal. 
Conflict between MIR and MNRI in factory workers' 
union, Cochabamba. 
13 Guillermo Bedregal rej oins MNR. 
14 Resignation of industry and finance ministers, attacked by 
MIR for pro-IMF policies. 
19 MNRI officially reunified; MIR re j ects offer of four 
portfolios. Suppression of protests by rightist-dominated 
Juntas Vecinales, La Paz and Cochabamba. 
Aug. 2 COB march 'against hunger and coups'. 
8 COB's Plan de Emergencia demands radical economic poli-
cies as condition for accepting cogobierno offered by Siles. 
23 Government insists on servicing external debt; offer of 
cogobierno effectively withdrawn. 
28 PDC enters new cabinet (8 MNRI; 2 PCB; 4 independents; 
2 PDC). MNR-ADN alliance gains control of Senate 
committees; UDP holds on to control of House of 
Deputies. 
Sep. 13 IMF visit demands austerity measures. 
Oct. Increase in sectoral strikes over pay. 
Visit of Ivan Kalin, Vice President Supreme Soviet, USSR. 
Nov. 10 Government concedes wage demands. 
17 Economic package includes devaluation, reduced food 
subsidies; congress attacks decree as unconstitutional; 
MNR presents bill to raise wages by 100%, passed in Senate 
with ADN support. Rumours of replacement of Siles by 
Jaime Paz. 
18 24-hour general strike against measures. 
Dec. 14 Cabinet resigns governmental crisis lasts 36 days. 
1984 Jan. COB 6-day hunger strike wins 57% wage rise. 
14 Congress censures ratified cabinet; Church sponsors talks 
on' convergencia national'. 
Feb. CEPB 48-hour strike 'against government irresponsibility'. 
Mar. Cabinet crisis over inclusion of independents; PCB 
demands incorporation of left-wing parties. 
Apr. MIR re j oins cabinet. 
12 Economic package includes 300% devaluation and 
effective end to sliding scale of wages; resignation of 
Walter Delgadillo from both cabinet and MIR. 
COB announces protest general strike. 
Employees of Central Bank (BCB) refuse to implement 
measures. 
May 1 COB stages hunger strike instead of general strike; wins 
wage rise. 48-hour strike in BCB 
30 COB-government agreement to suspend payments of 
interest on debt to foreign banks. 
Announcement of auction of Che Guevara's diary in 
London. 
Jun. 16 Military staff college (ECEM) demands removal of army 
commander, Gen. Sim6n Sejas. 
23 High Command ratified and 'rebels' punished. 
28 COB halts talks with government and declares general 
strike for early July. 
Siles kidnapped for 10 hours by officers of elite UMOPAR 
police unit under leadership of ex-Col. Rolando Saravia. 
COB postpones strike; ECEM condemns kidnap. 
Jul. 5 General strike, lifted after 3 days when government 
guarantees basic prices, awards 30% pay rise, and formally 
suspends debt repayments over 25% of export revenues. 
Visiting US Senator Paula Hawkins attacks lack of action 
against narcotrafico. 
20 128 foreign banks rej ect suspension of debt servicing and 
threaten legal action. 
31 Chapare declared a military zone. 
Aug. 6 Reinstallation of Congress; both houses now controlled 
by opposition after further MNRI split; PS-1 agrees to back 
UDP in Congress. 
17 Economic package devalues peso from 2,000 to 5,000 to 
US$. Head of anti-narcotrafico policy, Rafael Otazo, 
admits to discussions with Roberto Suarez in 1983. 
22 5-day oil strike. 
24 Congress begins censure of 7 ministers over Otazo 
affair. 
30 Murder of G.Iturralde, founding member of CEPB. 
Sep. 3 VI Congress COB; split between Direccion 
Revolucionaria Unificada (DRU) and PCB. 
4 CEPB 24-hour strike over Iturralde murder. 
5 ECEM conflict resolved after 4 months. 
7 Otazo fired. UMOPAR withdrawn temporarily from 
Chapare; replaced by army. 
11 Congress threatens to impeach Siles. 
13 DRU, led by Juan Lechin, wins leadership of COB; UDP 
regime denounced as 'bourgeois'. 
20 CEPB instructs members to ignore economic measures 
'contrary to the law'. 
22 COB-government talks over union Plan de Emergencia. 
Oct. 10 PDC leaves cabinet (now 9 MNRI; 2 PCB; 4 MIR; 3 
independents). 
12 COB demonstrates against economic measures, rej ects 
renewed offer of cogobierno. 
'Guerrillas' arrested in Luribay sentenced to 2-6 years. 
15 Gen. Sejas appointed Commander in Chief, to widespread 
military discontent. 
21 Commander of VIII Div. army requests withdrawal of 
unit from Chapare. 
25 Siles declares amnesty for Luribay prisoners, attacks 
Congress for subverting democracy, and stages hunger 
strike'for peace'. 
26 Government orders capture of Roberto Suarez 'dead or 
alive'. 
28 Siles halts hunger strike at request of Church, which urges 
political truce. 
31 Luribay prisoners remain j ailed after 34-day hunger strike. 
Nov. 3 Curfew lifted in Chapare after popular opposition to 
military control. 
7 Congress demands Siles clarify Otazo affair and renews 
impeachment threat. 
8 Church convokes political summit. 
9 Government re j ects Plan de Emergencia of the COB, 
which calls general strike, at first for 48 hours, then 
indefinitely. 
10 MNR proposes President of Supreme Court form 
provisional government. 
14 Political summit opens; strike continues with only 
emergency services in operation. 
18 UDP division over economic measures. 
21 PCB leaves cabinet. 
Government accepts plan to advance elections to June 
1985. 
23 Economic package; military deployment in major cities. 
COB suspends general strike for 48-hours. 
24 General strike lifted after 20 days; clashes with police. 
29 Refusal of army commander, Gen. Olvis, to be replaced 
opens crisis in military. 
Dec. 2 Olvis 'revolt' fails; Gen. Lopez Leyton becomes army 
commander. 
14 Jaime Paz resigns as Vice President; MIR and PCB leave 
UDP; splits within MIR deepen. 
1985 Jan. MIR-Bolivia Libre (MBL), led by Antonio Aranibar, 
established. 
8 Meat supplies halted by ganaderos demanding price rises. 
10 MNRI-dominated cabinet appointed amid spate of 
strikes. 
18 Indefinite national factory strike. 
22 New military appointments favour anti-Banzer officers. 
25 ASOBAN threatens closure of banks. 
Feb. Sharp divisions at V Congress of PCB. 
4 Conservative opposition accuses government of preparing 
'autogolpe'. 
8 Bloqueos on altiplano; military deployed. 
9 Economic package includes devaluation of 417%. 
11 Widespread popular mobilisation against measures. 
13 Police deployed in cities; La Paz student demonstration 
suppressed. 
14 Supreme Court orders military to respect amnesty for 
Luribay prisoners. 
15 Government threatens state of siege. 
24 Month-long transport strike ends with fare rise of 357%. 
Mar. 4 Large COB 'March for Bread and Freedom' in La Paz. 
8 COB declares general strike; armed forces on state of alert. 
13 Suppression of campesino bloqueos in Santa Cruz. 
17 Siles's offer of cogobierno rejected by COB. 
19 10,000 miners occupy central La Paz. 
20 Military occupy central La Paz; COB avoids confrontation. 
21 COB-government talks mediated by Church; elections 
delayed until July. 
23 COB lifts 16-day strike after government promises to 
restore sliding scale of wages. 
24 Miners leave La Paz. 
27 Congress increases parliamentary salaries to 15 times 
minimum wage. 
29 US Senator Paula Hawkins demands cut of all US aid if 
coca production not reduced by 10%. 
Apr. 9 Release of prisoners accused of murdering 'Luis Espinal, 
Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz (1980) and six members of 
MIR (1981). 
22 Siles vetoes joint military manoeuvres with US. 
May Renewed strike wave. 
18 Economic package effectively restores sliding scale of wages. 
28 CEPB political forum indicates MNR-ADN collaboration 
in new government ; right-wing unity over necessity to 
impose IMF austerity measures. 
Jun. 3 Three campesinos killed in police action against bloqueos 
in Cochabamba. 
4 COB demands nationalisation of banks. 
6 State expropriates Sheraton Hotel, La Paz. 
10 Teachers strike. 
Series of attacks by ultra-right UJC in Santa Cruz. 
20 INdefinite strike in BCB; no state wages issued. 
26 Garcia Mesa announces his return to the country on radio. 
Jul. 5 BCB strike lifted. 
10 Diplomatic relations established with Beijing; military 
discontent. 
11 Government effort to delay elections impeded by lack of 
congressional quorum. 
14 Elections. 
Aug. 4 MNR and MIR control new congressional leadership. 
PCB dissidents hold conference. 
5 Victor Paz Estenssoro (MNR) elected President by 
Congress. 
12 Garcia Mesa seen at Urkupina festival. 
29 Decree 21G60 establishes 'New Economic Policy' (NEP). 
COB calls 24-hour general strike. 
31 Military declare support for 21060; CEPB divided; COB 
leaders arrested. 
Sep. 2 FSTMB strike. 
9 COB declares indefinite general strike. 
13 State of siege; ADN gives full support to government 
actions. 
22 COB suspends strike. 
Oct. 1 Union leaders released. 
2 COB-government agreement. 
16 Signing of'Facto por la Democratic between MNR and 
ADN. 
18 Military welcome pact. 
24 Collapse of international tin price. 
Nov. 7 Strikes by teachers and miners of Huanuni. 
9 Decree 211105 makes concessions to private mines. 
Dec. Establishment of Fondo Social de Emergencia (FSE). 
19 State of siege lifted. 
1986 Jan. 8 ADN joins opposition to government plans for forced loan. 
10 Minister of Planning Sanchez de Lozada admits excessive 
emission of money. 
13 Congress rej ects forced loan. 
17 Sanchez de Lozada withdraws resignation after dispute 
with Foreign Minister Bedregal. 
22 New cabinet includes 5 ministers linked to ADN. 
23 24-hour general strike against NEP. 
25 US Senate committee visits Chapare. 
Feb. 1 Teachers declare indefinite strike against redundancies 
and for pay rise. 
5 Nuflo Chavez criticises new cabinet. 
6 New CEPB leadership criticises NEP. 
1,000 La Paz municipal workers fired. 
Departments stage 24-hour 'civic' strikes. 
19 Congress sends Garcia Mesa case to Supreme Court. 
Collapse of COB-government talks. 
24 Establishment of Eje de Emergencia by small radical 
parties. VII Ampliado CSUTCB resists official efforts to 
divide movement. 
Mar. 5 Departmental Civic Committees declare state of 
emergency over teachers' strike. 
11 Demonstrations over education. 
16 Agreement with IMF on budget cuts, tax reform and 
'real' exchange rate. 
18 Congress approves budget deficit of $175 million. 
Apr. 1 Government declares 75,000 teachers redundant. 
2 Demonstrations in La Paz and Cochabamba over 
education; health workers strike. 
8 Government breaks general strike over education. 
Garcia Mesa declares his innocence before Supreme 
Court, Sucre. 
10 Congress approves joint military manoeuvres with US. 
11 La Paz student dies following police repression of 
education demonstration. 
17 Episcopal Conference criticises NEP. 
20 Teachers' strike halted after wage agreement. 
23 Executive, backed by ADN and MIR, calls special 
congressional session to approve tax reform and new 
electoral law. 
24 Renegotiation of external debt begins. 
28 'Fuerzas Unidas' military manoeuvres with US begin. 
May 15 COB announces national referendum on tax reform, 
external debt and national sovereignty. 
17 Congress approves tax reform. 
18 XXI Congress FSTMB approves 'Tesis de Catavi' for 
union-directed reactivation of Comibol; setback for 
Lechin at hands of Filemon Escobar and PCB. 
Jun. 2 Garcia Mesa trial restarts after one month recess. 
Producers halt eradication of cocales in Cochabamba due 
to official non-compliance with agreements over aid. 
3 Closure of Matilde mine; IMF stand-by agreement. 
5 Juan Lechin resigns as executive secretary of FSTMB. 
6 Government announces plans to break up Comibol. 
12 FSTMB ampliado confirms Lechin resignation and Tesis 
de Catavi. 
16 Tax reform for rural sector postponed until 1987. 
24 48-hour oil strike declared illegal. 
30 Campesino demonstrations against tax reform. 
Jul. 1 Civic mobilisation in defence of mines, Potosi and Oruro. 
Detention of campesinos leading demonstrations. 
8 Congress declares COB Consulta Popular 
unconstitutional. 
9 48-hour oil strike, Santa Cruz. 
14 Decree 21367 establishes uniform import tariff of 20%. 
15 US troops arrive in Santa Cruz. 
16 National Conference of Civic Committees demands 
payments of oil royalties. 24-hour general strikes in 
defence of mines, Oruro and Potosi. 
19 Joint US-Bolivian military operations against narcotrdfico, 
Beni. 
25 COB Consulta Popular. 
29 FSTMB declares indefinite strike. 
31 Cochabamba demonstration against US troops. 
Aug. 5 Garcia Mesa granted 'licencia' by Supreme Court. 
8 Extraordinary CSUTCB congress attacks tax reform, NEP 
and education policy; backsTesis de Catavi. 
9 Camara Nacional de Industrias criticises NEP. 
10 Congress censures Supreme Court. 
15 Government asks US for $500 million for fight against 
narcotrafico. 
20 Exporters criticise Decree 21367. 
Six civic committees demand withdrawal of US troops. 
22 FSTMB4Marcha por la Vida y la Paz' leaves Oruro; 
Church urges government to negotiate. 
25 Decree 21377 'restructures' Comibol. 
26 Garcia Mesa returned to Sucre by airforce. 
29 5,000 miners on march halted by army at Calamarca. 
State of siege declared, c.200 arrested. 
Sep. 1 1 killed and several wounded by security forces in 
Cochabamba. 
2 FSTMB-government talks begin. 
4 MIR joins left in demanding end of state of siege. 
6 Assassination of Noel Kempff Mercado by 
narcotraficantes, Huanchaca, Santa Cruz. 
Pentagon says US troops will stay another 60 days. 
9 Congress approves 90-day state of siege. 
10 Carlos Borth, prosecuting in Garcia Mesa case, arrested. 
11 CSUTCB threatens direct action over political arrests. 
13 Government agrees to drop enforced cooperativisation in 
Comibol and releases prisoners. 
Declaration of wage freeze until end of year. 
15 COB lifts hunger strike. 
Hugo Banzer asks Paz Estenssoro to be more flexible. 
18 Coca price in Chapare falls to Bs. 20-30 m per carga; 40 
tons of paste siezed since January. 
19 Government declares use of military in anti-drug 
operations will be 'exceptional'. 
20 Filemon Escobar attacks FSTMB-government agreement 
of 13th. 
25 Government offers $42 m for'relocalizados'. 
29 FSTMB ampliado removes leadership elected at XXI 
congress. 
Oct. 1 New FSTMB leadership repudiates agreement with 
government, which refuses to negotiate; miners strike. 
8 Congress demands removal of UMOPAR officers involved 
in Huanchaca affair. 
9 Collapse of miners' strike; government agrees to talk. 
10 Chief of Police fired. 
Mobilisation of populace of Santa Ana de Yacuma, Beni, 
against UMOPAR. 
20 2nd Extraordinary Congress of FSTMB, Siglo XX, reflects 
crisis in leadership; Victor Lopez elected executive 
secretary in compromise, but defence of jobs given 
priority over battle for severance terms. 
21 Congress declares a rise in its pay by 18% to $1,400 per 
month. 
23 Widespread protests over congressional pay rise. 
24 Teachers reject draft education code presented by minister 
Ipina. 
28 Majority congressional report on Huanchaca effectively 
closes case. 
29 COB demands increase in minimum wage from Bs.40m 
($25) to Bs. 370m ($190). 
Nov. 5 Luis Sandoval Moron expelled from MNR for accusing 
minister of interior of cover-up in Huanchaca case. 
7 Consej o Nacional de Reforma Agraria announces new 
policy to eradicate small rural properties (minifundia). 
10 Assassination of FRI deputy Edmundo Salazar, prominent 
in investigation of Huanchaca case. 
12 Congressional maj ority refuses to reopen Huanchaca case. 
13 Police announce complete renovation of personnel in 
Direction Nacional de Sustancias Peligrosas (DNSP). 
14 Comibol announces closure of Catavi with'relocalizaciori 
of 883 remaining from labour force of 3,145. 
18 24-hour general strike, La Paz, over education. 
Eudoro Galindo expelled from ADN. 
21 Captain Jaime Paredes removed from navy for denouncing 
corruption. 
24 FSTMB accepts government's terms for4relocalizaciort. 
30 Government halts payment of full benefits to redundant 
miners. 
Dec. 3 Comibol announces that 19,000 miners have been 
'relocalizados'. 
7 Helicopter shot down by narcotraficantes in Chapare. 
8 2,000 relocalizados start hunger strike, Potosi. 
13 Conflict between Sanchez de Lozada and Bedregal 
resolved. Negotiations with Club of Paris include Plan 
Trienal de Lucha contra el Narcotrdfico, stipulating 
eventual enforced eradication of cocales. 
22 Main suspect in Huanchaca case escapes from Santa Cruz 
clinic. Minister of Industry resigns after assaulting traffic 
policeman. 
23 Government orders arrest of 30 Santa Cruz police officers. 
24 After 2 days La Paz hunger strike of relocalizados includes 
2,500. 
27 Government opens offensive against unregistered 
religious sects. 
30 Hunger strike lifted with agreement, mediated by Church 
to restore benefits to relocalizados. 
1987 Jan. 2 Indefinite doctors' strike for pay rise. Introduction of 
Boliviano (1 million old pesos). 
6 Suspension of doctors' strike conditional upon increased 
health budget. COB ampliado renews demands for 
increased minimum wage. 
14 Establishment of new army IX Division, Dept. La Paz, to 
counter 'guerrilla threat'. 
16 Moves to dissolve Christian Democratic Party. 
19 24-hour university strike for restored budget. 
20 La Paz retailers demonstrate against VAT. 
Floods in Cochabamba kill 20. 
30 1987 budget includes 10% rise in public sector wages; cuts 
education to 19% (35% in 1985). 
Feb. 9 78 police officers resign over corruption. 
10 48-hour oil strike. 
11 BCB union leaders stage hunger strike over transfer of 
$500 m to private banks. 
25 Teachers agree to start new school year upon guarantees 
against repression. 
Mar. 4 Comibol declares cooperativisation of Siglo XX and other 
mines. COB-CSUTCB state of emergency over anti-coca 
operations. 
5 University budget reduced from Bs. 78 m to Bs. 47 m. 
9 Censure of cabinet for failure to pay departmental oil 
royalties; Sanchez de Lozada threatens resignation. 
10 Cabinet resigns. 
Civic committees ofTarija, Chuquisaca and Santa Cruz 
repudiate MNR parliamentarians representing departments. 
11 National miners' strike declared; Lechin starts hunger 
strike. 
12 MNR-ADN negotiations over cabinet posts. 
Expulsion of MNR deputies who backed censure of 
cabinet. 
18 University demonstrations over budget. 
19 COB leadership and 150 miners on hunger strike. 
21 Hunger strikers rise to 1,500. 
22 Visit of West German president. 
25 Journalists join hunger strike; anti-government 
demonstrations. 
26 Emergency CSUTCB ampliado, La Paz, backs hunger strike. 
28 Government lifts state of siege. 
31 Hunger strike lifted. 
Government presents draft law on'sustancias controladas', 
giving control of all coca production and commerce to 
DNSP as basis for US- and Euro-funded Plan Trienal for 
eradication. 
Apr. 3 Resignation of Defence Minister Valle after giving speech 
in Congress while drunk. 
6 Government declares minimum wage of Bs.50; COB 
demands Bs.82. Budget of Caja Nacional de Seguro Social 
(CNSS) reduced. 
7 Extraordinary session of congress approves joint 
manoeuvres with US. 
8 COB rejects government wage offer and declares 
mobilisation; Lechin calls for resignation of Paz 
Estenssoro. 
11 Lechin accused of subversion. 
14 Anti-government demonstrations and fighting outside US 
embassy. 
22 24-hour general strike. 
Discussions in Montevideo with Chile over access to sea. 
May 1 Large COB demonstration, La Paz; 1,200 redundant 
miners stay in city. 
2 Government increases minimum wage to Bs.50. 
4 Start of 'Fuerzas Unidas 87' manoeuvres with US. 
10 Coca producers demand closure of UN project, Yungas. 
11 Bedregal attacks bishops' call for government flexibility 
as hypocritical. 
13 Wives of relocalizados occupy ministry of mines. 
16 CSUTCB attacks coca eradication policy and Plan Trienal. 
18 COB leadership hunger strike pro-relocalizados. 
20 Visit of King Juan Carlos of Spain. 
25 CSUTCB bloqueos in coca zones. 
27 Miners strike lifted after agreement on wages and benefits. 
28 Military break up campesino bloqueos in Cochabamba; 
4 killed, 20 wounded and 100 arrested. 
Jun. 6 CSUTCB-government agreement on voluntary eradication 
of cocales and development aid effectively annuls Plan 
Trienal. 
12 Chilean violation of airspace reported to OAS. 
20 Government denies plans to privatise health service. 
25 New social security system reduces state contributions 
and divides Cajas de Salud. 
30 24-hour general strike over social security and education. 
Ill Congress CSUTCB, Cochabamba, splits between 
Flores (MRTKL) and Morales (Eje) factions over 
allegations of corruption of Flores's leadership. 
Jul. 2 Bedregal attacks Sanchez de Lozada's plan to allocate 
private sector 40% of 'reactivation' funds. 
3 17 DE A agents expelled by campesinos of Chimore for 
'abuses'. 
CSUTCB congress ends in chaos as Flores re-elected and 
Morales group leaves. 
6 VII Congress COB, Santa Cruz, starts with shared 
CSUTCB delegation. Sanchez de Lozada dubs rumours of 
his candidacy in 1989 elections' una locura'. 
10 Decree 21660 outlines strategy for 'reactivation'. 
11 Victor Lopez elected executive secretary COB in 
compromise between outgoing Eje (ex-DRU) leadership 
and PCB-dominated opposition. 
13 Rural teachers declare indefinite strike; failure to restart 
school year. Agreement with Conservation International 
for purchase of $650,000 of debt in exchange for nature 
reserve. 
23 Oil strike. 
26 Hunger strike by secondary pupils pro-teachers. 
31 Oil strike lifted. 
Aug. 2 Teachers' congress declares indefinite strike for basic 
wage of Bs. 800. 
4 Government re j ects teachers' demands. 
11 Talks over education collapse; teachers demonstrate, La Paz. 
12 Captain Jaime Paredes jailed for 6 months for 'tendencias 
revolucionarias'. 
13 Extensive campesino bloqueos over education. 
14 Campesino killed at Huatajata in military suppression of 
bloqueo. Agreement with US to reduce cocales by 
minimum of 1,800 hectares; USAID to pay $2,000 per 
hectare but aid conditional upon target being met. 
21 Government refuses to negotiate over education; bloqueos 
continue. 
25 Teachers' marches in Oruro and La Paz repressed. 
28 Education strike ends with government agreement to pay 
$7m. in bonuses. 
Sep. 15 Bedregal accuses banks of misusing reactivation funds. 
18 Establishment of left-wing Alianza Patri6tica alliance to 
fight municipal elections. 
21 Suspension of reactivation funds to private banks. 
Suspension of $8.7m US aid for failure to meet coca 
eradication target. 
22 Agreement with Argentina over price of natural gas. 
Oct. 5 COB renews demands for rises in min. wage, education 
and health budgets. 
14 CSUTCB demands withdrawal of agrarian bill and tax on 
smallholders. 
15 Relocalizados stage hunger strike in central La Paz for 
payment of full severance pay. 
21 Government rejects COB demands. 
24 24-hour civic strike in Cochabamba over education. 
Nov. 4 Military open case against Garcia Mesa for sale of Che's 
diary. 
6 BCB intervenes Banco de Potosi. 
9 BCB intervenes Banco del Progreso. 
10 Civic committees of Tarija, Chuquisaca and Santa Cruz 
start legal moves to obtain oil royalty payments. 
13 Government agrees to pay royalties on monthly basis. 
21 2,000 relocalizados start new hunger strike for severance 
pay. 
26 COB demonstrations in major cities. 
Dec. 1 After Church mediation, government offers 950 jobs to 
relocalizados. 
3 Hunger strike lifted; 24-hour general strike. 
6 Municipal elections. 
10 Despite sharp MNR losses in elections, Paz refuses to 
moderate programme. 
1988 Jan. 6 COB suspends call for general strike and enters talks. 
8 Cochabamba campesinos suspend eradication of cocales 
and threaten march on La Paz; government offers talks. 
11 Coca producers' conference, Cochabamba. 
19 COB rejects 15% pay rise. 
26 Oil strike; government breaks talks with COB. 
27 Oil strike suspended at COB request. 
29 Coca producers demand agreement on development 
projects before resuming eradication. 
Feb. 3 48-hour general strike in Oruro; government accepts 
regional demands. 
4 Chaco veterans stage hunger strike for increased pension. 
5 COB-government agreement over coca ratifies accord of 
June 1987 and assigns $207m in compensation/ 
development. 
10 Talks over education fail. 
13 Domestic oil and gas prices increased. 
18 Government concedes pension of Bs. 150 to veterans. 
23 Oil strike. 
24 Concej o Municipal, La Paz, meets for first time; failure to 
elect mayor. 
26 Government breaks talks with COB. 
Mar. 1 48-hour general strike against oil price rise. 
3 800 relocalizados begin march to Yungas to produce coca. 
7 Military occupy oil installations; 700 workers fired by 
YPFB. 
9 Transport strike; COB declares state of emergency. 
10 La Paz university demonstration over budget; police enter 
campus; 1 killed. Relocalizados begin to return from 
Yungas. 
13 Oil strike suspended. 
14 Police break up COB march, La Paz. 
16 ADN and MIR agree that each will control La Paz 
mayoralty for half of official term. 
17 Government declares decentralisation of health and 
education to departments and regional development 
corporations; COB rejects. 
24 Demonstrations against decentralisation. 
30 Gas and oil prices rise by 30%. 
31 Producers halt coca production in Chapare in protest at 
UMOPAR abuses and lack of government aid. 
Apr. 4 Minimum wage increased to Bs.60 ($26). 
5 Bread prices increased by 25 % 
6 Police break up student demonstration in Oruro. 
Civic committees reject decentralisation. 
7 24-hour general strike in southern departments against 
decentralisation. School classes suspended by Ministry of 
Education. 
8 ADN criticises MNR application of NEP, demands cabinet 
posts and control of coca eradication programme. 
11 CSUTCB ampliado, La Paz, effectively removes Genaro 
Flores from power. 
13 Visit of US Attorney General, Ed Meese, to discuss drug 
issues. 
15 15 wounded in clashes during student march, Sucre. 
16 Clergy protest at appointment of non-Bolivian bishops. 
20 Decree 21923 excludes small rural properties from tax 
regime. 
24 Hunger strike by leaders of COB and universities over 
budget and coca policy. 
25 Deputy Freddy Vargas asks congress to send4narcovideos' 
to President. US House Foreign Affairs Committee 
proposes to reduce by 50% aid to Bolivia, Paraguay and 
Peru for failure to collaborate in antidrug policy. 
26 Congress excludes decentralisation from budget. 
28 Nanovideo scandal breaks in full. 
29 Coca producers refuse to negotiate over proposed Ley de 
Sustancias Controladas. 
30 Following repression of student demonstration, Potosi 
police station burnt down. 
May 4 Government offers negotiations with COB. 
5 COB ampliado continues hunger strike. 
La Paz police strike for 150% pay rise. 
7 COB halts hunger strike after 13 days on arrival of Pope 
(visit till 14th) 
17 Congressional debate on drug bill starts; opposition 
demands investigation of private bank accounts be 
included. 
22 Sanchez de Lozada declares candidacy for 1989 elections. 
23 Cochabamba coca producers give DE A 48 hours to leave 
Chapare; government rejects threat. 
Demonstration in La Paz for revision of drug bill. 
25 Congress cuts military budget. 
30 Demonstration in La Paz for revision of drug bill. 
Jun. 3 Government offer to raise health and education budget by 
8.3% rejected by COB. 
6 Estimated 30,000 campesinos stage bloqueos in 
Cochabamba against drug bill. 
7 Bloqueos broken by police and army; coup rumours. 
9 Cochabamba coca producers take US AID workers 
hostage. 
Faustino RicoToro elected president of Cochabamba civic 
committee. 
11 Cochabamba coca producers threaten to attack police 
stations if drug bill passed. 
13 Coca producers resume talks with government. 
15 La Paz Channel 4TVand Radio Metropolitana, owned by 
Carlos Palenque, closed by government for broadcasting 
Roberto Suarez's statement that Victor Paz is 'viceroy of 
cocaine'. 
16 Talks on coca collapse. 
20 After 2 years and 80 days first stage of Garcia Mesa trial 
closes. Ministry of Education announces decentralisation 
will not be applied. 
21 Ministry of Interior excludes possible use of herbicides in 
coca eradication. 
22 ADN deputy Alfredo Arce given licencia as nanovideo 
debate closes. 
23 US embassy declares herbicides not dangerous. 
Petrol price rise. 
27 5 campesinos killed by security forces, VillaTunari, 
Cochabamba, after occupation of police station; 
government denies DE A involvement. 
Jul. 5 Congress approves drug bill; demonstration in La Paz 
repressed; COB calls for civil disobedience. 
7 Congress increases members' salaries by 90% to $2,300 per 
month, backdated to March. 
11 Extraordinary Congress CSUTCB, Potosi, confirms defeat 
of Genaro Flores and emergence of Ofensiva Roja de 
Ayllus Kataristas; Juan de la Cruz Villca elected executive 
secretary. 
19 General strike against congressional pay rise brings La Paz 
to halt. 
21 Roberto Suarez arrested in Beni. 
22 Huanuni strike against imposition of three shifts. 
Aug. 6 Vice President Julio Garret proposes constitutional reform 
to allow second round in elections; rejected by MNR-ADN 
majority. 
8 Visit of US Secretary of State George Shultz. 
9 MNR and ADN ratify congressional pay rise. 
11 Following popular protests, congress reduces pay award 
fromBs. 5,200 to Bs. 3,300. 
20 Bedregal alleges that Sanchez de Lozada has support of 
Pentagon for his candidacy. 
23 MIR announces that if victorious in 1989 it will retain basics 
ofNEP. 
31 Campesino killed by military, Achacachi. 
Sep. 20 Government rejects congressional arbitration over 
Huanuni strike. 
21 Strike in Catavi mine. 
22 Teachers declare indefinite strike in demand of 100% pay rise. 
27 Presentation of Ley General de Desarrollo Agropecuario 
to congress. ADN demands ratification of 1985 Pacto if no 
overall winner emerges from 1989 elections. 
Oct. 4 Garcia Mesa makes death threat against prosecuting 
council. 
7 Removal of commander and 4 officers of army VII 
Division, Cochabamba, for selling weapons to 
narcotraficantes. 
11 Subsecretary of Social Defence, Jorge Alderete, in charge 
of drug policy, accuses navy of protecting narcotrdfico. 
21 Nuflo Chavez attacks S&nchez de Lozada as reactionary 
and Decree 21060 as lacking 'social dimension'. However, 
Sanchez de Lozada remains official MNR candidate, and 
Victor Paz brings opponents into line. 
24 Teachers suspend strike after 27 days on offer of Bs.50 
bonus. 
26 UMOPAR removed from Guayamerin after clashes with 
populace. 
Nov. 3 US cuts aid to navy. 
Health workers strike. 
10 II conference of municipal governments demands more 
control of local taxes. 
21 XII congress FSTMB elects Victor L6pez and Edgar 
Ramirez, advocating sharper resistence to Comibol and 
government. 
24 Doctors accept basic wage of Bs.600 and halt strike. 
TVencuentro of coca producers reaffirms refusal to eradicate 
cocales under new law. 
Dec. 2 Congress indicts Garcia Mesa for sale of Che's diary; 
ex-dictator takes 'asylum' in Sucre barracks. 
6 Assassination of Peruvian naval attache in La Paz by 
Sendero Luminoso. Ministry of Interior orders Garcia 
Mesa's arrest. 
7 Attack on congressional offices by Fuerzas Armadas de 
Liberaci6n ZarateWillka (FALZW). 
1989 Jan. 4 Drug law comes into operation. 
6 Government withdraws agrarian development law from 
congress. 
11 CSUTCB hunger strike against drug law and tax on 
communal property; 45 arrested. 
13 Garcia Mesa remains at large; Sucre police plead lack of 
resources. 
17 Chief of Police, Sucre, charged with failure to fulfill duty. 
21 Alderete complains at DE A domination of anti-narco 
operations. 
24 ADN-MNR relations enter crisis; PDC backs ADN 
electoral slate. 
25 Sanchez de Lozada opposes automatic congressional 
support for presidential candidate with highest vote; 
threatens 1985 pact. 
26 Congress suspends debate on budget due to lack of 
quorum caused by ADN. 
31 CSUTCB hunger strike suspended; prisoners released. 
Feb. 1 Budget approved, including tax on rural property (to begin 
in June). 
MIR alleges MNR fraud in preparation of electoral register. 
6 Electoral register closes. 
8 MNR demands extension of registration period and plans 
to call extraordinary session of congress. 
9 MNR-ADN pact broken; ADN militants resign public 
posts. Ministry of Interior declares foreign troops 
unnecessary for repression of narcotrafico. 
13 Bedregal attacks US Ambassador Gelbard for criticising 
Alderete. 
16 Garcia Mesa trial restarted with accused still at large. 
21 Lechin demands guarantees for political independence 
if he is to rejoin MNR. 
27 Garcia Mesa declares to press that he will remain 
underground. 
Mar. 1 Government agreement with coca producers for their 
inclusion in PIDYS development project. 
Catavi relocalizados stage bloqueos in central La Paz. 
3 Alderete resigns, declaring US wants to eradicate cocales 
but cannot reduce consumption. 
4 Garcia Mesa defence team presents court with list of 450 
witnesses. 
Populace of San Borja impede UMOPAR from seizing 2 
planes loaded with cocaine. 
6 Visit of US attorney General JohnThornburgh and 
Director of DE A John Law. 
7 Government repeats that anti-narco operations do not 
need foreign troops. 
9 US reiterates requirement that 130 hectares of coca be 
destroyed by April if US aid is not to be cut. 
13 24-hour civic strike in Santa Cruz demanding payment of 
oil royalties. 
15 Police break up hunger strike by relocalizados in La Paz. 
16 COB march pro-relocalizados. 
Visit of US Senator Paula Hawkins, who defends use of 
herbicides. 
20 Alderete removed from list of MNR candidates; US 
embassy denies DE A vetting of lists but admits to 
consultations with parties. 
28 CSUTCB requests members not to vote for MNR, ADN or 
MIR. 
Government reasserts that cocales will not be destroyed by 
force. 
Apr. 4 Relocalizados resume hunger strike. 
6 Huanuni declares indefinite strike. 
12 Tin price reaches $4.62 per lb. 
13 Coca producers' conference resolves to maintain talks with 
government but refuses to restart eradication or accept 
drug law. 
14 Huanuni strike suspended. 
Jaime Paz Zamora pledges to remove 21060. 
19 Relocalizados stage 'crucifixion' in La Paz; government 
halts talks. 
22 Police occupy university, La Paz, seat of relocalizado 
campaign. 
24 Government threatens state of siege but sets up special 
commission to deal with relocalizados. 
25 Tin price reaches $4.83 per lb. 
26 Relocalizados accept official offer of food and $500,000 
in pay-offs. 
May 3 MIR declares it will re j ect agreements with either ADN 
or MNR but not with other forces. 
Six members of 'Cristo Vive' sect drowned in Riberalta. 
5 Government declares two-thirds of commercial debt 
repurchased. CONDEPA denounces MNR fraud in 
electoral registration. 
7 General elections. 
8 Sanchez de Lozada announces his victory; ADN denounces 
official fraud in La Paz. 
9 Paz Zamora declares that MIR has good chance of forming 
next government because it can count on left-wing vote in 
congress. MNR attacks opposition 'plot' to annul election 
result. 
12 ADN-MIR talks to 'defend popular vote'. 
15 MNR accuses MIR and ADN of abusing departmental 
electoral courts. 
16 ADN declares it will not recognise a MNR victory; MIR 
attacks MNR fraud. 
19 La Paz electoral court (controlled by ADN and MIR) 
annuls 35,471 votes. 
21 Paz Zamora-Banzer talks. 
22 Sanchez de Lozada asks episcopal conference to arbitrate 
electoral impasse; rejected. MNR raises possibility of 
annulment. 
23 CONDEPA rejects talks with MNR. 
Argentina declares itself unable to repay debt for several 
months. 
24 Three Mormon missionaries killed by FAL-Zarate Willka. 
26 ADN and MIR agree to annul 50 ballot boxes from Potosf. 
27 National Electoral Court (CNE) announces final election 
results; ADN claims CNE to be above all judicial scrutiny 
bar that of Congress. 
30 PS-1 and MRTKL demand cancellation of specific results 
where 'incorrect calculation' by departmental electoral 
courts shown and admitted; parties also demand revision 
of results where 1986 electoral law alters victory (affects all 
parties bar MIR). 
Jun. 1 High Command rules out intervention in political process. 
IU demands revision of results in four departments. 
5 Airforce operations on Peruvian border to locate supposed 
presence of Sendero Luminoso. 
8 Ministry of Interior announces forcible eradication of 
cocales from July. 
9 La Paz district court declares itself unable to consider 
petitions against CNE. 
13 Further reports of Sendero Luminoso activity in border 
region. 
19 Four students detained for Mormon killings. 
20 DEA attacks lack of cooperation by local authorities. 
21 Garcia Mesa trial suspended for fourth time since January. 
IU demands withdrawal of 1986 electoral law. 
22 UMOPAR operation in Santa Ana de Yacuma results in six 
deaths in exchange of fire with navy. 
26 Government-ANAPCOCA agreement on growers' 
participation in PIDYS. 
27 ASOBAN denies capital flight is serious. 
Large demonstrations mark anniversary of VillaTunari 
killings. 
28 Government announces start of forced eradication in 
Chapare on 23 July. 
Campesino leader Evo Morales held and tortured for 
alleged protection of narcotraficante. 
29 Government assesses capital flight over last 60 days at $21 
million. COB asserts innocence and demands release of 
students held for Mormon killings. 
Jul. 4 La Paz demos over FAL-Zarate Willka arrests. 
Ambassador Gelbard declares 'the Bolivian government 
does not have control over its own territory' with respect to 
Santa Ana affair. 
6 Army Commander General Romulo Mercado attacks 
Gelbard. 
12 La Paz j udge excuses himself from Mormon case after 
allegedly receiving death threats. (Others follow). 
Roger Cortez (PS-1) and Victor Hugo Cardenas (MRTKL) 
stage hunger strike in Congress against electoral fraud. 
21 CEPB accuses parties of creating climate of instability. 
Government postpones forced eradication of cocales and 
asks for talks with growers. 
24 CSUTCB declares state of emergency over eradication. 
27 Human Rights Organisation declares Garcia Mesa hiding 
in hacienda owned by Banzer. 
Max Fernandez calls on military to intervene. 
Following televised debate on electoral law major parties 
agree revision is necessary. 
Aug. 1 MNR offers coalition to ADN; re j ected in favour of 
alliance with MIR. 
Capital flight put at $90 million. 
Cortez and Cardenas hunger strike lifted. 
3 Paz Zamora guarantees continuation of NEP to CEPB. 
4 Congress elects Paz Zamora president. 
6 Paz Zamora inaugurated. 
APPENDIX II 
BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
APPENDIX III 
EXCHANGE RATES, 1980-86 
Official Rate Parallel Rate 
1980 25 25 
1981 25 25 
1982 Nov. 196 250 
1983 Jan. 196 341 
Mar. 196 475 
June 196 432 
Sept. 196 761 
Dec. 500 1,244 
1984 Jan. 500 2,300 
Feb. 500 2,100 
Mar. 500 2,800 
Apr. 2,000 3,000 
May 2,000 3,400 
June 2,000 3,250 
July 2,000 4,350 
Aug. 5,000 6,500 
Sept. 5,000 14,600 
Oct. 5,000 15,000 
Nov. 8,571 17,090 
Dec. 8,571 22,124 
1985 Jan. 8,571 63,240 
Feb. 45,000 113,090 
Mar. 45,000 120,204 
Apr. 45,000 159,816 
May 67,000 272,375 
June 67,000 481,756 
July 67,000 885,476 
Aug. 75,000 1,182,303 
Sept. 1,077,887 1,087,441 
Oct. 1,102,065 1,120,206 
Nov. 1,197,367 1,336,719 
Dec. 1,588,613 1,715,869 
1986 Jan. 2,057,645 2,240,216 
Feb. 1,840,118 1,916,881 
Sources: Institute National de Estadfsticas; Banco Central de Bolivia. 
APPENDIX IV 
MONTHLY INFLATION RATE, Oct. 1982-Dec. 1986 
Source: Institute) National de Estadi'sticas. 
1982 Oct. 14.63 Dec. 60.85 
Nov. 16.76 1985 Jan. 68.76 
Dec. 7.76 Feb. 182.77 
1983 Jan. 0.60 Mar. 24.94 
Feb. 10.25 Apr. 11.78 
Mar. 11.82 May 35.66 
Apr. 8.37 June 78.46 
May 9.25 July 66.30 
Jun. 3.20 Aug. 66.46 
July 10.07 Sept. 56.51 
Aug. 25.94 Oct. -1.87 
Sept. 16.41 Nov. 3.20 
Oct. 11.57 Dec. 16.80 
Nov. 24.78 1986 Jan. 32.96 
Dec. 25.92 Feb. 7.95 
1984 Jan. 9.56 Mar. 0.07 
Feb. 23.00 Apr. 3.59 
Mar. 21.13 May 0.97 
Apr. 62.97 June 4.26 
May 47.01 July 1.78 
June 4.06 Aug. 0.66 
July 5.17 Sept. 2.28 
Aug. 14.99 Oct. 0.59 
Sept. 37.32 Nov. -0.11 
Oct. 59.12 Dec. 0.65 
Nov. 31.55 
APPENDIX V 
TIN PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS 
(i) Production 
(metric tonnes) 
Exports 
(US$000) 
Av. Price 
(US$ per tonne) 
1980 28,000 378,149 16,784 
1981 29,781 343,096 14,148 
1982 24,660 278,344 12,712 
1983 26,660 207,906 12,961 
1984 17,000 247,748 12,218 
1985 16,136 186,747 11,570 
1986 11,500 89,810 4,832 
1987 5,800 47,638 6,771 
(ii) Exports by Sector (US$000) 
Comibol Mineria Mediana Mineria Chica 
1980 83,699 15,216 38,344 
1981 32,097 11.816 32,612 
1982 19,713 8,869 11,911 
1983 13,282 6,578 11,872 
1984 33,129 5,240 17,628 
1985 4,773 24,741 23,186 
1986 1,695 13,273 18,388 
1987 - 16,278 11,052 
(iii) Comibol Mines Production (tonnes) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Catavi 3,950 3,438 2,578 2,630 2,168 1,318 751 
Huanuni 4,694 4,730 3,460 3,017 2,754 2,643 1,626 91 
Quechisla 1,919 2,184 1,500 1,458 1,122 736 372 12 
Unificada 1,756 1,499 455 255 178 351 171 
Colquiri 1,730 1,883 1,750 1,864 1,141 799 534 71 
Others 4,572 7,144 8,158 6.807 5,642 4,191 795 210 
Source: Asociaci6n Nacional de Mineria Mediana. 
APPENDIX VI 
REAL WAGES 
(i) Index, 1982-6 (Quarterly; Nov. 1982= 100) 
1983 1 103.4 
2 88.2 
3 80.9 
4 91.9 
1984 1 65.5 
2 69.5 
3 65.5 
4 150.5 
1985 1 122.0 
2 100.5 
3 34.0 
4 67.8 
1986 1 71.1 
2 70.1 
3 73.6 
Source: Juan Antonio Morales, in Bruno et al., Inflation Stabilization. 
(ii) Structure of Waged Income by Sector (July 1988;%) 
Self- Prof-
Bolivianos Total Workers Employees Empl'd essionals Owners 
0-100 25.7 25.0 22.8 30.7 4.9 10.7 
101-200 19.5 26.2 21.6 15.5 8.6 11.9 
201-300 13.9 19.0 16.4 10.6 9.4 10.7 
301-400 10.0 12.4 11.9 7.8 9.2 9.3 
400 + 30.9 17.3 27.3 35.4 67.9 57.3 
Average (Bs.) 358.8 240.7 307.0 470.1 815.1 720.1 
Source: Coyuntura Economica Andina, 1989. 
APPENDIX VII 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Total Tax Revenue 9.6 9.2 4.8 2.8 3.3 10.1 13.2 17.4 
(% GDP) 
Internal Revenue 32.6 32.0 39.9 52.5 24.4 12.8 24.0 35.8 
(% total) 
External Revenue 21.7 22.9 20.0 15.2 18.0 15.4 14.1 15.1 
(% total) 
Mining Taxes 16.1 6.2 9.1 4.0 27.6 2.7 0.2 0.4 
(% total) 
Hydrocarbon Taxes 15.7 30.2 24.3 12.7 12.2 64.8 56.7 49.7 
(% total) 
Source: Arthur Mann, 'The Political Economy of Tax Reform in Bolivia'. 
APPENDIX VIII 
SYNOPTIC ELECTION RESULTS, 1980-89* 
1980: General % vote seats 
Hernan Siles Zuazo (UDP) 38.74 53 
Victor Paz Estenssoro (MNR) 20.15 40 
Hugo Banzer Suarez (ADN) 16.83 25 
(Siles elected by congress, Oct. 1982, with 113 votes) 
1985: General % votes seats 
Hugo Banzer Suarez (ADN) 28.56 51 
Victor Paz Estenssoro (MNR) 26.47 59 
Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR) 8.84 16 
(Paz Estenssoro elected by congress, by 94 votes against 51 for Banzer) 
1987: Municipal % votes 
ADN 24.94 
MIR - Nueva Mayoria 22.88 
MNR 11.78 
1989 General % votes seats 
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (MNR) 23.07 49 
Hugo Banzer Suarez (ADN) 22.07 46 
Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR-NM) 1964 41 
(Paz Zamora elected by congress, by 97 votes against 50 for Sanchez de Lozada) 
* Note: Leading parties only; congress has 157 seats (deputies -130; senators -
27). 
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